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Executive 
Summary
    Legal entities or persons might want to neutralize the greenhouse gas 
emissions they have caused with their activities. In the context of this paper, 
voluntary compensation is defined as the cancellation of emission reduction 
credits that have been generated in a project-based approach. The question 
“Which compensation project should be selected?”, which is one of the central 
aspects of analysis, is a classic example of decision theory from the perspective 
of the compensating entity.
    Two major drivers for voluntary compensation are identified: moral re-
sponsibility and economic benefits. The first category covers environmental 
and social issues, the second marketing and image effects for the compensat-
ing entity.
    In section 2, major characteristics of compensation projects are identi-
fied. These include inter alia the delivery of real emission reductions, environ-
mental impacts, support of sustainable development, costs of compensation, 
credibility and public reputation, project type, and situation in the host coun-
try. In addition, the concept of “high-quality projects” is discussed. Potential 
interactions between those characteristics are examined, looking at project 
type and price of reduction certificates. Thereafter, a methodological approach 
for the selection of voluntary compensation projects is proposed. The method-
ology considers both the value system of the compensating entity and project 
characteristics. It is based on a differentiation between selection criteria and 
indicators, which operationalize the criteria. Selection criteria, for example a 
project’s success probability under a given regulatory regime, or project type 
and location, are weighted according to the preferences of compensating enti-
ties. Several indicators are of a quantitative nature, others are derived from 
qualitative assessment. A project’s performance with regard to the individual 
indicators/criteria is to be evaluated by experts and results in a quantitative 
scoring. Thus, a ranking of different projects within a given group is possible.
    Section 3 applies the developed methodology to several case studies. The 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH decided 
to offset its CO2 emissions by means of reduction certificates from a Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM) project. Five of the submitted project ideas have 
been selected for this study. Following that, a sensitivity analysis for the de-
fined parameters – indicator scores Sn and weighting factors wn – is conducted. 
Major results are that the proposed methodology is indeed suitable to consider 
both project characteristics and individual value systems of compensating 
entities in a standardised manner. An adaptation to the individual task may 
be  appropriate,  e.g.  the  consideration  of  additional/less  indicators.  Expert 
judgement is necessary to comprehensively consider all project characteris-
tics, especially the facets of CDM regulations. The case studies also reveal that, 
regardless of the predefined structures of the approach, a considerable degree 
of freedom is given to the evaluating expert. In order to enhance consistency 
of results, the evaluation of a given set of projects should be conducted by the 
same expert. Finally, quantitative results should not be interpreted too strict-
ly. The methodology allows a grouping of projects, but not a sharp ranking 
based on the second decimal point. 
    In section 4, the interactions of voluntary compensation and interna-
tional climate policy systems – the Kyoto System and the European Union 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – are discussed, both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms. Preconditions for interactions are that the 
compensating entity chooses an underlying regulative regime which gener-8
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ates credits that are also eligible under the above named regimes. The most 
relevant category currently is the CDM, followed by Joint Implementation (JI) 
projects. The analysis comes to the conclusion that theoretically interactions 
exist. Voluntary compensation increases the demand for the given certificate 
type and thus increases market prices. At the same time, the necessity for fur-
ther emission reduction increases, which enforces the ecological objective of 
the climate policy systems. However, quantitative impacts of voluntary com-
pensation will be very limited in the short to medium term. This evaluation is 
based on a survey of service providers on expected volumes and certificate 
types.9
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    A potential interrelation between anthropogenic emissions of green-
house gases (GHG) and increases in global temperatures has been recognised 
by the international community in the 1980s. Since then, intensive research 
has been conducted by natural scientists to evaluate the thesis of human in-
terference with the global climate system. In 1988, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded by the World Meteorological Or-
ganization (WMO) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). The IPCC is a 
panel of international experts that assesses the state of international climate 
change science. Its findings are reported in regular intervals and represent the 
consensus of experts involved from all over the world. 
    It is obvious that these analyses contain uncertainties, e.g. uncertainties 
within models and model assumptions as well as uncertainties regarding the 
impact of complex parameters such as impacts of clouds and dust particles. 
Furthermore, uncertainties are due to the natural variability of the climate 
system  itself  (Hadley  Centre,  2004).  However,  climate  models  have  been   
improved over time and new scientific findings have been included, e.g. with 
regard  to  the  influence  of  certain  parameters.  In  1995,  the  Max  Planck 
Institute for Meteorology, Hamburg, concluded that the natural greenhouse 
gas effect is reinforced by anthropogenic behaviour with a 95% probability   
(WGBU, 1995).
    In its Second Assessment Report (SAR) from 1996, the IPCC concluded that 
the “balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence 
on global climate” (IPCC, 1996a, p. 22). In the Third Assessment Report (SAR, 
2001), the IPCC stated that “the major part of warming which has appeared in 
the past 50 years results from the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere”. The IPCC also expected an average temperature increase 
of 1.4 to 5.8 °C by the year 2100 compared to 1990 (IPCC, 2001a, p. 13) with a 
medium value of 2.5 °C. Estimates of the Second Assessment Report were only 
1.0 to 3.5 °C over the same period of time (IPCC, 1996). The Hadley Centre, UK, 
recently estimated the most likely warming for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 
to be 3.5 °C, with a 90% probability that the warming will be between 2.4 °C 
and 5.4 °C (Hadley, 2004). 
    One central question with regard to climate change is its consequences 
for social, economical and ecological systems. A common understanding is 
that impacts will strongly differ by region. Impacts will range from increases 
in both maximum and minimum temperatures, changes in regional precipita-
tion patterns, increases in tropical cyclone peak wind intensities, melting of 
arctic ice and inland glaciers and, in the long term, increases of the sea level. 
A detailed analysis can be found in IPCC (2001). A quantification of economic 
effects currently is not possible on a global scale. However, the German Advi-
sory Council on Global Change (WBGU) argued as early as 1995 that at least a 
reduction of 45-50% of industrialised countries’ CO2 emissions1  is necessary in 
order to stay in a “tolerable temperature window” concerning the social and 
economical burden of climate change impacts: a 5% reduction of the global 
gross domestic product (GDP) was considered as non-acceptable (WBGU, 1995). 
1.1  |  Scientific  background:  anthropogenic  contribution  to  global 
     warming
1  |  Background and objectives
1   The underlying assumption is that emissions  
of Non-Annex-I-countries do not further increase. 
Non-CO2-Gases had not been included in this 
evaluation.10
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Today, the WGBU argues for a CO2 concentration target of 450 ppm, which re-
quires a reduction of 45-60% of global energy related Carbon Dioxide plus sig-
nificant reductions of Non-CO2-Gases. Industrialised countries should reduce 
their emissions by 20% by 2020 (WBGU, 2003), and by 77% in 2050 (WBGU, 1997) 
– always in comparison to 1990 levels. 
    In 1992, the international community agreed that climate change consti-
tutes a serious threat and that measures must be taken to stabilise GHG con-
centrations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents “dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system” (Art. 2 of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)). The UNFCCC entered into force in 
1994 and laid the basis for the Kyoto Protocol (1997). The latter came into effect 
on February 16th, 2005 and defines emission targets for 38 industrialised coun-
tries, the so called Annex-B countries. Targets are defined for the commitment 
period 2008-2012, compared to 1990 emissions, for a basket of six (groups of) 
greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) as well as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluor-
ocarbons (PFCs). 
    Besides target setting, core elements of the Kyoto Protocol are the so 
called flexible mechanisms – namely International Emissions Trading (IET), 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). These 
market-based instruments have been included to increase the economic effi-
ciency of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. to reduce costs of attaining the given environ-
mental target. The background to all these mechanisms is that, contrary to 
local pollutants, the location of GHG emission is irrelevant for its global warm-
ing effect. Consequently, it is economically rational to direct reduction meas-
ures to those places where mitigation costs are lowest. Comprehensive discus-
sions on the Kyoto Protocol and efficiency gains by IET are given in Oberthür/ 
Ott (1999) and Tietenberg (1985).
    While IET is the trading of emission rights primarily on the level of   
Annex-B  countries,  CDM  and  JI  are  project  based  mechanisms  and  create   
reduction certificates, which then can be accounted on the emission target of 
a given country. One central aspect of the project based mechanisms is the 
1.2  |  Political and economic background
Figure 1: Quantification 
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quantification of emission reductions due to the project activity. For CDM 
projects and JI projects (Second Track), this is done by means of a “baseline”. 
The baseline constitutes a reference scenario for the emissions situation that 
would have existed in the case that the project activity was not conducted. 
Accountable emission reductions can be quantified in subtracting the projects’ 
(real)  emissions  from  the  (theoretical)  emissions  baseline  of  the  baseline   
scenario, also see Figure 1, p. 10. More detailed information on determinants 
for baselines and typical CDM/JI project cycles can be found in chapters 2.2   
and 3.3.
    Generated  reduction  certificates  have  a  monetary  value  and  can  be   
traded like emissions rights. 
    The concept of emission certificates as described above can not only   
be applied by Parties of the Kyoto Protocol, but also by other stakeholders to 
compensate for their GHG emissions or – in some cases – to comply with   
national climate policy targets2. Such stakeholders can be legal entities like 
companies and public institutions or individuals. In the following, all such 
stakeholders will be subsumed under the generic term compensating entity 
(CE). Compensation means that GHG emissions that have been caused by a 
certain activity or behaviour are “neutralized” by equivalent emission reduc-
tions elsewhere. 
    The following example visualizes the concept of voluntary compensa-
tion (VC): In a given year, travelling activities of a company have caused emis-
sions of 20,000 t CO2. These emissions will be offset by reducing an equivalent 
amount  GHG  emissions  (20,000  t  CO2-eq)  elsewhere.  The  reduction  project 
could, for example, be the avoidance of methane emissions3 from a landfill or 
the increase in efficiency of a combustion installation. The travelling activity 
thus becomes “climate neutral”. 
    The concept of emission certificates allows players to compensate for 
their emissions relatively easily, whereas physical mitigation of emissions is 
not realisable for many. Commercial service providers started to offer volun-
tary compensation services in the early 2000s. 
    Today, several compensation products are on the market and usually in-
clude the following steps: 
–   calculation of emissions to be compensated by a given activity,
–  information on the compensation project(s) or even selection choice for    
  the customer,
–  payment and certification of compensation.
    Offered products/services differ with regard to the calculation method, 
types of mitigation projects used as well as project standards involved, project 
location and certification mode. Sterk and Bunse (2004) give an overview of 
commercial products on the market and highlight some of their differences.
    Besides using commercial services, a compensating entity has the option 
to either buy reduction certificates on the carbon market (e.g. via a broker), to 
buy options of reduction credits from a selected project or to invest in a mitiga-
tion project himself. One common aspect of these options is that the compen-
sating entity has to select a mitigation project that fits his demands. Determi-
nants for this selection process are the central aspect of this paper, also see 
chapter 1.4.
1.3  |  Background of voluntary compensation 
2  The acceptance of Certified Emission Reduction 
Credits (CERs) from CDM projects under the 
European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading 
Scheme is an example hereof.
3  Methane is one of the GHGs covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol and has a global warming potential (GWP) 
of 21 – compared to CO2.12
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    While voluntary compensation of GHG emissions is still a young and 
small market, there are already some remarkable examples: the conferences 
Renewables 2004 (Bonn) and Carbon Market Insights 2004 and 2005 (Amster-
dam) were designed CO2-“free”. The German Delegation chose to offset travel-
ling emissions to the 10th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC in 
Buenos Aires 2004, and the annual international conference for hydrogen and 
fuel cells technologies in Hamburg is also CO2 neutral since 2002. A further 
example of CO2 neutral events will be the Soccer World Cup 2006 (Green Goal, 
2005).
 
    The underlying study has three objectives. The first objective is to discuss 
which criteria are suitable for the selection of compensation projects while 
considering the value system of the compensating entity – a classical case of 
applied normative decision theory. This is done in section 2 of the paper. One 
central aspect will be the environmental integrity of approaches used for vol-
untary compensation of greenhouse gas emissions. Costs per t CO2 equivalent 
as well as project risks are two other main categories. As a first step, drivers for 
voluntary compensation are identified as they constitute the basis for project 
selection. In addition, a review of existing selection concepts on the interna-
tional level is given. Following this, relevant project parameters and interac-
tions between those parameters will be discussed. Based on the insights from 
those analyses, a methodology for project selection will be developed and pre-
sented as a proposal.
    The second objective is to conduct case studies to test the theoretical con-
cept and to gain an understanding of its practical consequences (section 3). A 
case in point is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH, which decided to offset its CO2 emissions in 2003. Several project 
ideas had been submitted to the GTZ to apply for the compensation project. The 
paper will exemplarily evaluate some of them under the value system of the 
GTZ and under a fictitious second value system as sensitivity analysis. These 
case studies include:
–   a hydro power project in India,
–  a wind energy project in North Africa,
1.4  |  Objectives of the paper
Box 1: GHG emissions 
suitable for voluntary 
compensation
Which GHG emissions are suitable for compensation?
Basically, all types of GHG emissions can be compensated for. A first differen-
tiation is possible between direct and indirect GHG emissions. Direct emissions 
are those which are released directly and immediately into the atmosphere. 
Indirect emissions are those which occur in a different place and at a different 
time from the activity itself. 
Major sub-categories of direct GHG emissions are emissions related to trans-
port (car, train, airplane, maritime transport) and to space heating (households). 
If electricity is generated for own consumption e.g. by means of a diesel gen-
erator, resulting emissions would be counted as direct emissions as well. Indi-
rect emissions can be differentiated into production-related emissions, applica-
tion-related emissions (including e.g. centralized electricity generation) and 
disposal-related emissions. Basically, emissions of the whole product cycle can 
be included.13
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–   a landfill gas project in North Africa,
–   a biological waste water treatment plant in South East Asia,
–   an industrial fuel-switch project in South America.
    Finally, in section 4 the interactions of voluntary compensation projects 
and the international climate policy system will be discussed. The focus is on 
the Kyoto System and the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). Underlying methodologies of this section are a qualitative 
theoretical analysis and a quantitative evaluation based on a survey of service 
providers.
    It should be noted that the paper does not discuss or evaluate options for 
quantification of emissions that are to be compensated for. Neither does it go 
into detail on quantification options for emission reduction certificates as 
these issues have already been discussed in detail previously by other re-
searchers, for instance, baseline development, by Müller-Pelzer (2004). The 
concept of “additionality” is discussed by Langrock et al. (2000) and Greiner/
Michaelowa (2003). The current status of CDM regulations is described by 
Michaelowa (2005). 14
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    The selection of GHG reduction projects for voluntary compensation may 
be considered a typical case of decision theory. The paper deals with aspects of 
normative decision theory; descriptive aspects are not analysed. Per defini-
tion, normative decision theory “is a theory about how decisions should be 
made in order to be rational” (Hansson 1994, p. 6). One can differentiate be-
tween several stages of a decision process. For example, Brim et al. (1962, p. 9) 
define the following phases: 
1.  Identification of the problem 
2.  Obtaining necessary information 
3.  Production of possible solutions 
4.  Evaluation of alternatives 
5.  Selection of a strategy for performance
6.  Implementation of the decision 
   
    For the purpose of the paper, the problem is defined as the selection of an 
appropriate GHG compensation project that satisfies the demands of the com-
pensating entity while delivering environmental benefits in an optimal way. 
In the following chapters, necessary information both on compensating enti-
ties’ demands and environmental aspects are obtained, different possible so-
lutions are drawn up and a selection strategy is developed. An evaluation of 
the alternatives is conducted by means of the case studies in chapter 3. It   
becomes obvious that there is some overlapping of the phases defined by   
Brim et al.
    The paper does not elaborate on the theoretical concepts of decision-mak-
ing under certainty, under uncertainty, or under ignorance. Hansson (1994), 
Laux (2005), and Schmidtke (2004) provide detailed information on this as-
pect. However, elements of the underlying concepts are applied within this 
study. 
    What is the motivation for voluntary compensation of GHG emissions? 
Answers  to  this  question  are  fundamental  for  the  discussion  of  selection   
criteria  as  the  overarching  targets  of  a  compensation  entity  influence  its   
demands  on  a  compensation  project.  Two  main  groups  of  drivers  can  be   
identified: 
–  moral responsibility, and
–   economic benefits.
    These driver groups can be further distinguished. Table 1 gives an over-
view of driver groups, individual groups and elements of such drivers. 
     Most of these drivers and elements are self-explaining, so only a few as-
pects are highlighted in the following. At first glance, one might question how 
compensation of GHG emissions might contribute to sustainable develop-
ment. The underlying idea is that some mitigation projects can contribute to 
the sustainable development of the host country, if they entail the transfer of 
new/more efficient technologies and technological know-how. As the host 
2 | Selection of voluntary compensation projects
2.1  |  Drivers for voluntary compensation15
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country can transfer this knowledge and technologies to other sectors, it will 
be enabled to switch to a sustainable development path more quickly. The con-
tribution to host country sustainable development is one central aspect of the 
CDM, also see chapter 2.2. On the investor country’s side, one might argue that 
compensation projects increase the overall awareness of climate change and 
thus foster a more responsible behaviour.
    The compensation of GHG emissions can also have positive marketing 
and/or image effects4. It underpins an entity’s responsible behaviour and the 
entity will be evaluated as doing “something good”. The German brewery 
Krombacher can be cited as an example here. In 2002/2003, it ran a large mar-
keting campaign by promising that for each beer crate sold, it would buy and 
thus save one square meter of tropical rain forest (Krombacher, 2003). This is 
comparable with compensation for GHG emissions as it targets a well-known, 
global  problem.  Further  examples  of  event  marketing  are  provided  in   
chapter 1.3.
Table 1: Drivers for 
voluntary compensation
4  There is some overlapping between the drivers’ 
marketing and image⁄reputational effects.
   
    Differentiation of drivers by groups of compensating entities?
    One might pose the theory that private players are exclusively driven by 
the first category, while for legal entities economical drivers dominate. In practice, 
however, the above identified drivers act together and result in a compensation 
decision. The share of moral and economic drivers will depend on the visions 
and objectives of the legal entity. Commercially driven companies can – in 
principal – be expected to put more emphasis on marketing and image effects. 
2.2  |  Existing categories of reduction certificates and underlying 
    regulative regimes
    Before discussing the relevance of individual selection criteria, an over-
view of formal categories of reduction certiﬁcates is given. On the international 
level, various regulative regimes exist. They differ with regard to eligibility re-
quirements, formalities, and rules for quantiﬁcation of emission reductions. 
The main categories are:






Reduction/avoidance of harmful impacts on the 
global climate system by own behaviour
Other  positive  environmental  effects,  e.g.  soil 




Global fairness – e.g. work towards equal/similar 
per capita emissions 
Responsibility for future generations







Compensation offor activities leading to a nega-
tive public reputation
General improvement of public image
Marketing 
effects
Marketing of a given event or a given product
Marketing of a given brand name or legal entity16
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–  Joint Implementation (JI) or National Compensation Projects (NCPs), which 
   generate Emission Reduction Units (ERUs); 
–   Veriﬁed Reduction Projects, which generate Veriﬁed Emission Reductions   
  (VERs); and
–  Green Investment Schemes (GIS), which result in project-backed Assigned   
  Amount Units (AAUs).
    A  further  option  to  compensate  GHG  emissions  would  be  to  retire   
emission  allowances,  e.g.  from  the  EU  emissions  trading  scheme  or  AAUs,   
without having used the right to emit. As this category is not connected to miti-
gation projects, it is not further considered in the following. Neither are non-
veriﬁed emission reductions considered, because they do not adhere to any 
rules at all.
    Some of the above named categories can further be divided into sub- 
categories. For example, the category CDM entails the sub-categories “Regular 
Scale”, “Small Scale” and “Gold Standard”. A further differentiation is possible 
between technical projects and “LULUCF projects” (which is not eligible under 
the Gold Standard category). An overview of existing project categories is pro-
vided in Figure 2. Major characteristics of the relevant categories are presented   
below.
 
    Clean Development Mechanism Projects 
    The CDM is one of the project-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Article 12) and ofﬁcially started in 2000. A GHG mitigation project is underta-
ken in a so-called “Non-Annex-I-Country”, which is a developing country. GHG-
reductions are quantiﬁed by means of the above described baseline concept and 
result in Certiﬁed Emission Reductions. At the same time, the CDM is supposed 
to support developing countries with their sustainable development.
    In recent years, a quite complex set of regulation has been developed on 
the international level. The most important statutes are the Marrakech Accords 
as well as decisions of the so-called CDM Executive Board (CDM EB). Major ele-
ments of the accreditation process for CDM projects are:
–   host  country  approval  and  adherence  to  national  sustainability  criteria,   
  if deﬁned by the host country;
–  establishment of a Project Design Document (PDD) as the basis for regist- 
  ration at the CDM EB. The PDD entails a detailed project description, the 






















2005  |  Sonja Butzengeiger  |  Voluntary compensation of GHG emissions:
Selection criteria and implications for the international climate policy system
   baseline choice and application  – including an additionality check – and the 
   quantiﬁcation of expected CERs, the Monitoring and Veriﬁcation Plan, as well 
   as information on public participation;
–   validation of documents by an independent authority (Designated Operati- 
  onal Entity, OE);
–   registration of the project by the CDM EB;
–   project implementation and monitoring/documentation of the project acti- 
  vity by the project developer;
–   veriﬁcation and certiﬁcation by the OE;
–   issuance of CERs by the CDM EB. 2% of the CERs are withheld by the CDM EB. 
   Revenues from their sale will be spent on adaptation measures in developing 
   countries.
    Given the fact that developing countries do not have binding emissions 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol, the concept of additionality is of special rele-
vance. It has been debated intensively as interests of project developers and 
environmental advocates often clash. 
    Several sub-categories of the CDM exist. A ﬁrst differentiation is made 
with regard to “project size” – in terms of installed capacities and/or annual 
emission reductions. Small scale projects beneﬁt from simpliﬁed rules and do-
cumentation requirements, whereas regular scale projects have to pass a strict 
and more complex project cycle. Second, technical projects can be distinguished 
from afforestation and deforestation projects (so-called “sinks projects”). Due to 
their special characteristics, separate rules have been deﬁned for the latter. 
    More detailed information on CDM project cycles and determinants for 
baselines can be found in Krey (2004), Michaelowa (2001), Butzengeiger et al. 
(2005), Michaelowa et al. (2003a), Bode et al. (2002), CaPP (2002). Some aspects 
will be highlighted in chapter 3.3.
    Gold Standard CDM Projects
    Finally, the concept of Gold Standard (GS) has to be mentioned. It has been 
developed by environmental NGOs, which are concerned about the environ-
mental integrity and the general quality of CDM projects. The Gold Standard 
deﬁnes quality standards for CDM (and JI) to ensure that projects deliver cli-
mate protection and sustainable development objectives. These standards are 
grouped into project type, additionality and baselines and sustainable develop-
ment criteria. Certain project types like sinks projects, large hydro power pro-
jects or fossil fuel related projects are excluded. A project’s additionality is che-
cked by a set of questions, all of which are aiming to answer the two basic 
questions “Would the project have occurred in the absence of the CDM?” and 
“Will the project result in lower greenhouse gas emissions than would have 
occurred in the absence of the project?”.
    The sustainability screening consists of an environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA), the application of a sustainable development indicator basis and a 
review of the public consultation process. A separate PDD for Gold Standard 
Projects has been developed that reﬂects the additional requirements.
  In short, the Gold Standard stands for a quality label in terms of environmen-
tal beneﬁts and contribution to sustainable development. More information on 
the Gold Standard is provided by WWF (2002, 2003) and Sterk/Langrock (2003).
    With regard to voluntary compensation, the most relevant characteristics 
of CDM projects are that the location of the project is restricted to developing 
countries, that the detailed set of rules guarantees a minimum “quality level” 18
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and that there are several sub-categories. The Gold Standard Label can be con-
sidered as the premium-quality sub-category.
    Joint Implementation and National Compensation Projects
    These project-based mechanisms function similarly as CDM projects. The 
major difference is that they take place in “Annex-I-Countries”, i.e. industria-
lised countries. According to the regulations of the Kyoto Protocol, this implies 
that emission reduction credits generated by a project activity are deducted 
from the host country’s emissions budget. The host country thus has an interest 
not to overestimate the amount of emission reduction credits by a given project 
activity.
    Joint Implementation is deﬁned in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, and will 
commence in year 2008. Formalities for JI projects depend on the on the host 
country. The easy ﬁrst track can be used, if the host country fulﬁls all eligibility 
criteria  under the Kyoto Protocol. In this case, the host country can deﬁne its 
own criteria for baselines and issuance of ERUs. If the host country does not 
fulﬁl all eligibility criteria, a similar project cycle as for CDM projects results. 
This also includes the approval by a Supervisory Committee (equivalent to   
CDM EB) and an external veriﬁcation by Independent Authorities (equivalent 
to OE). For details see Michaelowa (2001).
    National compensation projects are unilateral JI projects. The idea of NCPs 
evolved during the discussions on the EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) in late 2003 (AGE 2004). Since the EU Commission has a scep-
tical  attitude  on  NCPs  due  to  potential  overlapping/double-counting  with   
EU ETS, NCPs are only in the conception-phase. Rules still have to be deﬁned.   
In sum, these projects are not yet of practical relevance, but this can be expected 
to change in the next 1 to 2 years.
    Veriﬁed Reduction Projects
    The major characteristic of Veriﬁed Reduction Projects is that there are no 
general, internationally deﬁned rules. Project developers apply their own stan-
dard, which implies that project characteristics and quality can vary signiﬁ-
cantly. A minimum quality is suggested as reductions are veriﬁed. However, no 
veriﬁcation standards exist. The certiﬁcate unit of this project type is called Ve-
riﬁed Emission Reductions (VERs). VERs cannot be used for compliance under 
the Kyoto Regime or under the EU ETS.
    In short, there are no restrictions in time, place or project type. As no mi-
nimum quality standards are deﬁned, a compensating entity that is concerned 
about the quality aspect will need to evaluate a given project in detail. An inte-
resting aspect with regard to transaction costs is that one could apply CDM 
standards without going through the formal CDM process. This would reduce 
transaction costs while setting quality requirements. 
    Green Investment Scheme (GIS)
    The basic idea of GIS is that Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) of an Annex-
B-Country of the Kyoto Protocol are sold and the revenues are re-invested in 
GHG reduction measures. One differentiates between soft and hard GIS. Soft GIS 
is the promise of the host country to conduct political measures as climate 
change or energy conservation awareness-campaigns, etc. Hard GIS entails a 
direct investment in technical mitigation measures. The latter category thus 
generates “project-backed AAUs”.19
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    With regard to marketing/image effects of voluntary compensation, the 
use of GIS must be evaluated carefully. The reason is due to the political back-
ground of GIS. It is based on the fact that many countries in transition own sig-
niﬁcant amounts of “surplus AAUs” as a result of strongly declining GHG emis-
sions  since  1990  due  to  economical  decline.  Although  this  does  not  have 
negative environmental impacts, the whereabouts of hot air is a politically sen-
sible issue (key word “indulgence trading”). For details of GIS see Kokorin (2003), 
Point Carbon (2005a).
    Having presented the major characteristics of different project types, cost 
implications will be compared brieﬂy. Due to the different characteristics and 
options for utilisation, the individual certiﬁcate categories are traded as sepa-
rate commodities. Table 2 gives an overview of typical price ranges for “Candi-
date CERs/ERUs”, CERs/ERUs, AAUs and VERs. It becomes obvious that the ex-
pense for compensation also depends on the compensating entities´ choice of 
certiﬁcate type, as prices vary by an order of magnitude.
    Selection criteria for voluntary compensation projects (VCPs) have not 
been comprehensively identiﬁed or evaluated in current literature. Usually, a 
few criteria are selected and then discussed qualitatively. Findings of relevant 
papers are summarised below.
    Besides the price of reduction certiﬁcates (€ or $ per ton of CO2-eq), Braun 
and Stute (2004) evaluate service providers of VC on the basis of whether an 
independent certiﬁcation of emission reductions is conducted as a quality check 
and if compensation projects have already started. If projects are still to be de-
veloped, this can be interpreted as an indicator for a project’s additionality (also 
see chapter 3.3). Furthermore, the method and transparency of calculation of 
emissions that are to be compensated have been evaluated. One central aspect 
in this regard is the consideration of a Radiative Forcing Index (RFI) for airplane 
travelling. However, these aspects are not the focus of the paper and will there-
fore not be considered further. 
    Sterk and Bunse (2004) also consider customer orientated issues such as 
the type of conﬁrmation. Identiﬁed options include a certiﬁcation of “CO2 neu-
trality” or the issuance of donation receipts. Besides that, some further parame-
ters on the aggregated level as location of the project, category of project (sinks 
project or technical project) and category of underlying regulations (self-deﬁ-
ned rules versus internationally accredited ones) are identiﬁed. The paper of 
Sterk and Bunse also aims to guide compensating entities in the selection of 
“high-quality compensation options” . The quality-issue will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2.3.2.
Commodity Type Vintage Year [€/t CO2-eq]
Candiate CERs/ERUs 2000/08-2012 1.0 - 3.5
CERs/ERUs 2000/08-2012 4.0 - 7.0   
AAUs 2008-2012    4.0 - 6.0*
EU allowances 2005-07    7.5 - 17.5
VERs   0.5 - 1.5
*price prior to the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol
2.3  |  Relevant project characteristics
2.3.1 |  Literature review
Table 2: Price ranges for different 
certificate types
Source: Von Ruffer (2004), various 
GHG market newsletters20
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    While  it  must  be  noted  that  it  is  close  to  impossible  to  identify  all   
potential selection criteria as a result of a compensating entity’s individual – 
and potentially hidden – objectives and preferences, the list of above-named 
criteria  can  be  signiﬁcantly  expanded.  In  order  to  reduce  complexity,  the   
author proposes to differentiate between selection criteria on the one hand   
and  indicators  on  the  other  hand.  The  approach  is  described  in  detail  in   
section 2.4.
    This chapter provides an overview of compensation projects’ characteris-
tics with relevance for selection choice of the compensating entity. The objecti-
ve is to introduce relevant parameters and to provide background information, 
but not to rank or evaluate them, since this will be done in the subsequent sec-
tions. Relevant project characteristics are:
–   quality of the project or project type,
–   delivery of real emission reductions,
–   project start date,
–   environmental impacts and positive effects,
–   support of sustainable development,
–   (relative) costs of compensation,
–   credibility of the compensation effort,
–   visualisation to the public,
–   fulﬁlment of regulative requirements and data availability,
–   project type,
–   situation in host country,
–   quantity of emission reductions delivered,
–   timing of delivery.
    Quality of the compensation project or project type
    It can be expected that the general interest of any compensating entity is 
to engage in a high-quality compensation project, no matter if the overarching 
driver of the entity is moral/environmental responsibility or economical bene-
ﬁts. In the former case, striving for high quality is part of “doing something 
good”; in the latter case it supports the marketing/image effect. 
    It must be noted that the term “high quality” leaves lots of room for inter-
pretation and strongly depends on the stakeholder’s value system. Interpreted 
strictly, it constitutes a concept, which can be materialized by indicators like 
delivery of real reductions, project type, etc. The concept of high-quality can be 
applied both to a speciﬁc project and to project types. 
    Environmental non-governmental organisations tend to deﬁne renewab-
le energy and small scale projects as high-quality projects, while projects with 
regard to Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) – the so called sinks 
projects – are considered critical (e.g. WWF/Greenpeace 2000, CAN Internatio-
nal 2002, FERN 2000). The attitude of scientists towards LULUCF projects is also 
diverse (Bodegom et al. 2000, Dutschke 2002/2005). Sterk and Bunse evaluate 
quality on the basis of project standards (= underlying regulative regime), pro-
ject size and project type. Gold Standard and “small scale source sinks with sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁts to local communities” are evaluated as quality options, while 
standards developed by the service provider and sinks projects are considered 
problematic to bad (Sterk/Bunse, 2004, p. 19).
2.3.2 |  Overview of major project characteristics21
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    On the project level, the following indicators might be applied to select 
high-quality projects:
–  reasonable quantiﬁcation of emission reductions,
–   economic and political additionality of the project activity,
–   independent veriﬁcation of remission reductions,
–   fulﬁlment of requirements of relevant regulations.
    Delivery of real emission reductions
    The two major factors for consideration with regard to the delivery of real 
reductions are a reasonable quantiﬁcation of emission reductions and the eco-
nomic and political additionality of the project activity. 
    For a reasonable quantiﬁcation of emission reductions, the concept of ba-
selines is of central relevance. As has been pointed out in chapter 1.2, a baseline 
is the reference scenario for the emissions situation in case the mitigation pro-
ject was not implemented. Several assumptions have to be made to establish a 
baseline, e.g. with regard to remaining lifetimes of replaced installations/equip-
ment (case of retroﬁt project), with regard to future emissions intensities for 
electricity generation in [kg/MWh] for a given grid (e.g. case of renewable ener-
gy project), or with regard to autonomous energy efﬁciency improvements. The 
baseline scenario has a strong inﬂuence on the quantity of emission reduction 
certiﬁcates that will be generated by a given project. Figure 3 schematically por-
trays the effects of two major parameters – time and extent of autonomous 
efﬁciency improvements – on the quantity of reduction certiﬁcates. Please note 
that the quantity of reduction certiﬁcates is equal to the integral between ba-








relative emmissions of compensation project [kg CO2 / MWh]
scenario: late replacement, high autonomous efﬁciency improvement
scenario: early replacement, low autonomous efﬁciency improvement
    As the baseline constitutes a counterfactual scenario, it will in most cas-
es not be possible to check its correctness (Michaelowa, 2001). The ecological 
integrity of compensation effort therefore depends on a conscientious, con-
servative development of the baseline scenario. Further information is pro-
vided in chapter 3.3.
    The concept of additionality is explained in general terms in the follow-
ing paragraph, while chapter 3.3 gives an overview of additionality require-
ments under the CDM. As has been described above, baselines are used to 
Figure 3: Influence of 
baseline choices on volumes 
of reduction certificates22
HWWI Research  |  Report No. 1  
by the HWWI Research Programme International Climate Policy
quantify the environmental benefit of a given project in terms of GHG reduc-
tion. However, if baselines solely consider environmental aspects but do not 
assess whether the project activity is attractive for economical reasons, one 
might calculate emission reductions for something which would have hap-
pened anyway. The calculation itself might be fully correct. But, as the project 
would happen anyway, it does not entail an additional ecological benefit. If 
the overall objective is to keep the ecological integrity of compensation ap-
proaches, only such projects should be used that are “additional”. 
    Several concepts have been proposed on how to determine a project’s ad-
ditionality with a special focus on CDM projects. Examples are Langrock et al. 
(2000), Greiner/Michaelowa (2003) and Michaelowa (2005). Further elabora-
tion is given in chapter 3.3.
    Project start date
    It has been mentioned above, that the project start date (past/future) can 
be considered a major parameter. Braun and Stute point out: “At a first glance, 
it might look more respectable to invest in existing projects. From the ecologi-
cal perspective, however, it might also make sense to invest in projects that did 
not start yet […]. Thus, effectively new projects will be initiated.” (Braun/Stute, 
2004, pp. 9-10). This evaluation relates to the aspect of additionality. 
    Strictly interpreted, however, the start date can only be seen as a (strong) 
indicator of a project’s additionality. Project developers might have included 
the expected income from sales of reduction certificates in their investment 
decision8. Hence, even projects that already started might be truly additional 
and deliver real emission reductions. It would thus be unreasonable to evalu-
ate all projects that already commenced as non-additional and label them as 
“bad” projects. Instead, a case-to-case evaluation including the consideration 
of broader project circumstances is appropriate for practical purposes.
    An early project start is also in line with the international CDM regula-
tions. The Marrakech Accords and decision 18/CP.9 provide guidance on the 
eligibility of a proposed CDM project which started before registration. Project 
developers need to “provide evidence that the incentive from the CDM was 
seriously considered in the decision to proceed with the project activity. This 
evidence shall be based on (preferably official, legal and/or other corporate) 
documentation that was available to third parties at, or prior to, the start of 
the project activity” (FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2).
    Other positive environmental effects – air quality, soil quality, water quali-
ty, biodiversity
    A GHG reduction project can lead to beneficial side-effects for the local 
and/or regional environment. An example hereof is the replacement of diesel 
generators for electricity generation by wind power. Not only do reductions of 
fuel consumption due to the project activity lower CO2 emissions, but they also 
reduce emissions of local pollutants as NOx, SO2, noise, etc. At the end, the 
project also brings about health benefits for the local population.
    The list of potential positive environmental side-effects can be very long; 
it also depends on local circumstances. A case-to-case evaluation will be neces-
sary to identify the benefits of a given project activity. Typical positive side 
effects include:
–  reduction of local air pollutants as NOx, SO2, Cl, Hg, dust, carbon black,   
  noise, etc.;
8   This argumentation is used in practice with regard 
to accreditation of CDM projects (e.g. PDD for CDM 
project Nova América Bagasse Cogeneration Project 
in Brazil, submitted February 2005). Also, the con-
solidated additionality test of the CDM EB asks 
project developers to “provide evidence that the 
incentive from the CDM was seriously considered in 
the decision to proceed with the project activity” in 
cases where the crediting period is supposed to start 
prior to the project registration (UNFCCC 2004, p.1).23
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9   It should be considered that the impact of a single 
compensation project often will be negligible on the 
national scale. Consequently, this parameter will only 
play a minor role in practice.
–  positive  effects  on  the  project  area/surrounding  as  a  biological  habitat   
  (e.g. number and variety of species, size of population);
–  positive effects on major soil parameters, soil contamination, vegetation 
   coverage, etc.;
–  contribution to sustainable waste water management, substances of con- 
  tent, etc.
    Support of sustainable development of host country
    Positive side-effects of a GHG mitigation project with regard to the sus-
tainable  development  of  the  host  country  can  be  manifold  and  strongly   
depend on the concrete project. Typical characteristics are that the project   
activity:
–  leads to technology transfer to the host country;
–   leads to positive effects with regard to international trade or market ac- 
  cess9 (indicators hereof can be increase of the regional/local gross national 
   product, positive changes in income streams, etc.);
–   meets or exceeds the sustainability criteria as defined by host country or as 
   defined by international organisations.
    Costs of voluntary compensation
    From the perspective of the compensating entity, costs of voluntary com-
pensation are of major importance and will therefore constitute an important 
selection criterion. The financial determinants for the compensation effort are 
the quantity of compensated emissions [t CO2-eq] and the relative price of reduc-
tion certificates [€/t CO2-eq].
    As has been discussed in chapter 2.2, different types of reduction certifi-
cates exist, depending on project type and certification regime. Prices per ton 
of CO2 reduction depend on these categories and currently vary between 0.5 
and 7.0 €/t CO2. Some compensating entities such as the German Federal Mini-
stry for the Environment obviously would be willing to pay up to 15-20 €/t 
CO2-eq for a high-quality project (Wandscher, 2004).
    Table 3 gives an indication on needed financial budgets, depending on 
the price of certificates and the quantity of compensated emissions. To provide 
some reference: emissions resulting from the conference Renewables 2004 
(travelling and energy consumption) were estimated to about 2.500 tons CO2-eq 
(Wandscher, 2004), while CO2 emissions of Deutsche Telecom (Germany) only 
from travelling were estimated on 52.300 t in 2003 (Campino, 2004).




Price per ton of emission reduction [€/t CO2-eq]
x 1 x 2.5 x 5 x 7.5 x 10 x 12.5 x 15 x 20
500 500 1,250 2,500 3,750 5,000 6,250 7,500 10,000
1000 1,000 2,500 5,000 7,500 10,000 12,500 15,000 20,000
2500 2,5000 6,250 12,500 18,750 25,000 31,250 37,500 50,000
5,000 5,000 12,500 25,000 37,500 50,000 62,500 75,000 100,000
10,000 10,000 25,000 50,000 75,000 100,000 125,000 150,000 200,000
15,000 15,000 37,500 75,000 112,500 150,000 187,500 225,000 300,000
20,000 20,000 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 400,000
50,000 50,000 125,000 250,000 375,000 500,000 625,000 750,000 1,000,00024
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    Credibility of compensation effort
    The credibility of the compensation effort is crucial if the compensating 
entity pursues image and/or marketing effects. Indicators for a high credibil-
ity of the mitigation project include the application of internationally accred-
ited rules and an independent verification of emission reductions.
    Visualisation to public
    Comparable to the issue of credibility, a good visualisation to the public is 
important with regard to image and/or marketing effects. Indicators hereof might 
include a low level of technical complexity to make the approach understandable 
to the broad public, as well as a good public image. Interestingly, the service pro-
vider HEW (product “Green Events”) came to the conclusion that sinks-projects 
are easier to communicate to the public than technical projects (Beeck, 2003). 
    Fulfilment of regulative requirements and data availability
    A compensating entity may accept only those projects that fulfil the re-
quirements of a given certification regime. If the entity, for example, decides 
to compensate its emissions by means of a CDM project, this project will have 
to fulfil the UNFCCC rules on baseline-setting, additionality, etc.
    In this regard, the availability of data can become a relevant selection 
factor. The establishment of baselines and the additionality analysis for a 
given project strongly depend on solid data, which can also be verified by in-
dependent  bodies  (Butzengeiger/Michaelowa,  2005).  Examples  are  market 
shares of a certain type/manufacturer of a technology (e.g. heating boilers) or 
the availability of long-term loans in a given country. At least with regard to 
CDM regulations, it is insufficient to “have a feeling on something” – facts and 
figures need to be provided (Krey, 2005).
    In sum, availability of adequate data can be considered an important 
aspect for practical purposes. Bad or insufficient data can make a project fail 
to meet the requirements of an anticipated standard.
    Situation in host country 
    The situation in the host country constitutes another relevant aspect for 
project selection. The three following aspects seem most significant: 
–  The risk profile of the host country, which influences the overall success 
  probability of the compensation project. The OECD’s Country Risk Classifi- 
  cation or Country Corruption Indices might serve as indicators in this regard. 
–   The institutional situation in the host country – both in terms of public 
   business administration (e.g. approval process for new installations) and in 
   terms of compensation-specific procedures. An example for the latter cate- 
  gory is the set-up of a “Designated National Authority (DNA)” as the official 
   national approval body for CDM projects. 
–   Existing contacts to operators and/or partners of the compensation project, 
   which can significantly improve an investor’s trust in the project.
    Project type
    Various types of GHG compensation projects exist. The term “project 
type” itself can be interpreted in several ways. In this context, it is defined as 
the “technical” origin of greenhouse gas reduction as for example, energy ef-
ficiency improvements or fuel switch. Figure 4 gives an overview of major 
project types and sub-types.25
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10  The issue of discounting of reductions to gain the 
same environmental benefit is not discussed within 
the scope of this paper.
Figure 4: Types of compensation 
projects (non-exhaustive)
 
    Quantity of emission reductions generated by project activity
    The  quantity  of  reduction  certificates  generated  by  a  compensation 
project can be a major selection criterion; especially if a large volume of emis-
sions is to be compensated. In those cases, it might be easier to select  a single, 
“large” project that generates enough emission reductions than to select sev-
eral “smaller” projects, which in aggregate generate as many reduction cer-
tificates as needed. 
    If a single-time-event is the object of compensation, this could be done 
with a smaller project that delivers equivalent reduction certificates over time10. 
If continuous emissions are to be compensated, it might be considered easier 
to choose a project that delivers the appropriate amount of annual reductions.
    Timing of delivery of reduction certificates
    Compensation projects can have a more or less extended lead-time. The 
lead time is also influenced by the complexity and formalities of the underlying 
certification regime. Projects that are certified according to self-developed stan-
dards will generally have a lower formal lead-time than those projects that are 
certified according to extensive regulations such as the official CDM rules. The 
formal lead-time for the latter can be up to 2-2.5 years (Michaelowa, 2005a).
    Most of the project characteristics identified in section 2.3 are not inde-
pendent of one another. Figure 5 exemplarily visualises interactions between 



































2.3.3 |  Interactions between project characteristics
Quantity of
certificates
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    As interactions are manifold, it is not possible to conduct a comprehen-
sive analysis within the scope of this paper. Instead, the relation between cost 
of voluntary compensation and project type and size are discussed exemplarily.
    Costs of compensation and project type/size
    There are three major factors influencing the price of emission reduction 
certificates and thus the costs of voluntary compensation. These are: 
–  technical reduction costs,
–  transaction costs related to the generation of reduction certificates,
–  the seller’s expectations on income from reduction certificates. 
    Table 5 compares CO2 reduction costs for different technologies for the 
case in Germany. Table 6 compares total installed system costs for renewable 
energy technologies. Both tables show that technical reduction costs strongly de-
pend on the project type. While quantitative figures are variables that depend 
inter alia on the project’s location (e.g. different costs for construction and la-
bour; taxes, etc.), the structural differences due to the technology type remain. 













































































































































































































































































“High quality project” X (x)* X X X X (x)**
Delivery of real reductions (x)* X
Other environmental beneﬁts X
Contribution to sustainable 
development
X X (x) (x)
Costs of voluntary compensation X X
Credibility of compensation X (x)* X X
Visualisation to public (x) (x) (x) X
Fulﬁllment of regulative 
requirements
(x) (x) X X
Project type X
Quantity of emission 
reductions generated
(x) X X
Timing of delivery X X X
X = strong indicator, (x) = potential indicator
*case-by-case decision, **dependent on value system of CE
Table 4: Interactions between 
project characteristics
€/t CO2 min max
Hydro Power -25 120
Wind Power 26 75
Solarthermal 240 680
Heat Insulation Roof 0 220
Heat Insulation Wall -60 400
Fuel Switch coal-gas 5 35
Biomass Power 40 120
Combined Heat + Power (CHP) -118 128
Photovoltaics (PV) 490 1,040
Carbon Capture + Storage (CCS) 25 45
Source: Blesl et al. (2003), Rosenbauer (2005)
Table 5: Co2 reduction costs 
for different technologies in Germany27
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    As Michaelowa et al. (2003) point out with regard to CDM projects, trans-
action costs per unit of emission reduction strongly depend on the project size 
in terms of annual reductions. The range goes from 0.1 €/t CO2-eq for very large 
projects (more than 200,000 t CO2 reduction per year), over 0.3-1 €/t CO2-eq for 
projects with an annual CO2 reduction of 20,000-200,000 t and 100 €/t CO2-eq 
for mini projects (200-2,000 t CO2-eq/year). For Photovoltaic projects with reduc-
tions of less than 200 CO2-eq/year, transaction costs of 1,000 €/t are stated.
    To conclude, there is a strong relationship between project type/size and 
relative costs of voluntary compensation. A compensating entity that focuses 
on cost-efficiency of the compensation might prefer large projects and low-
cost technologies, e.g. landfill gas collection/flaring, geothermal energy or 
large hydro power. A compensating entity, which prefers renewable energy 
projects, e.g. photovoltaic electricity generation or mini hydro power plants, 
should be prepared to pay higher relative prices. 
    However, it is not possible to provide generally valid price indications 
because there are not only differences in mitigation and certificate generation 
costs, but also differences in the project developer’s (sellers) strategy in terms 
of co-financing and profit expectations. Assume two identical projects A and 
B in terms of cost structures and volumes of reduction certificates generated. 
Project developer A strives for an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 8% and ex-
pects revenues from sales of reduction certificates to generate 50% of this. He 
thus offers certificates at a price of 10 €/t CO2-eq. Contrary to that, project devel-
oper B offers certificates at a price of 20 €/t CO2-eq, as he strives for a higher IRR 
and/or because he expects revenues from certificate sales to generate a larger 
share of the returns.
    After the most relevant project characteristics have been presented and 
discussed in section 2.3, in this section a proposal for a project selection meth-
odology is presented. The first important point is a differentiation between 
selection criteria and indicators. Section criteria are used to compare different 
Table 6: Installed system costs 
for renewable energy technologies
System costs for renewable energy 
technologies in $/kW (2003)
2003 2013
Biomass co-ﬁring with coal 300 180
Onshore Wind 1,000 700
Landﬁll Gas 1,200 1,000
Biogas (Anaerobic sewage treatment) 1,200 1,075
Biogas (Anaerobic animal waste treatment) 4,000 3,000
Geothermal 1,400 1,200
Biomass Gasiﬁcation (CC) 3,550 1,200
Low-Impact Hydro (Canada Small) 2,400 1,800
Low-Impact Hydro (USA Small) 4,250 4,000
Mini Hydro 4,700 4,450
Parabolic Concentrated Solar Power 3,000 2,800
PV – Commercial 6,500 4,000
PV – Residential 9,000 5,000
Source: Frantzis (2003)
2.4  |  Proposal for a project selection methodology
2.4.1 |  Selection criteria and indicators28
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projects with regard to pre-defined aspects; they work on a more or less ag-
gregated level. Indicators help to evaluate a project’s qualities either qualita-
tively or quantitatively; they thus constitute the basis for comparison. A selec-
tion criterion can be evaluated through one or several indicators; also see 
Figure 6. 
    With regard to the project characteristics discussed in chapter 2.3.2, it is 
important to note that several of them can function both as a selection crite-
rion and an indicator. Examples hereof are the start date of a project activity 
or qualification as Gold Standard. A selection criterion could be “only projects 
that did not start operation/construction yet”, while it can also be an indicator 
for the selection criterion “delivery of real reductions”.
     The methodological differentiation between selection criteria and indicators 
also has practical relevance. Typical compensating entities might be strained 
by a large number of criteria. Therefore, a reduction to a limited set of selection 
choices seems advisable. However, if one would simply neglect some parameters, 
an incomplete picture of the project’s qualities as well as unqualified and poten-
tially wrong decisions would be the consequence. The following proposal there-
fore differentiates between aggregated selection criteria, on which a compen-
sating entity will have to decide and indicators, which are used to evaluate 
projects in detail and to substantiate the selection process. This approach will 
limit the need for selection/qualified decisions by the compensating entity 
while at the same time securing the quality of the selection process. 
    Table 7 summarises the proposed categorisation of project characteristics 
into the categories selection criteria and indicators. They indirectly correspond 
to the drivers for voluntary compensation as identified in chapter 2.1. In prac-
tice, an adaptation of the listed indicators to the individual case might be nec-
essary, because not all aspects are relevant for all project types.





Indicator A.I Indicator B Indicator C.II Indicator A.II Indicator C.I
Selection Criterion C Selection Criterion B





Delivery of real emission reductions
Project start date




• local air quality
• soil quality, water quality






Positive effects on sustainable 
development on host country
Transfer of (innovative) technology
Effects on international trade, market access, etc.
Economic implications
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    It already has been pointed out that both drivers for and demands on 
voluntary compensation projects might differ significantly between compen-
sating entities (CE). Thus, the definition of a fixed standard priority list of se-
lection criteria is not reasonable11. 
    With regard to the proposed methodology for project selection, selection 
criteria and indicators are assigned to three categories:
–   Category I: selection criteria which can be taken as exogenous ramifica- 
  tions, e.g. limited financial budgets of the compensating entity.
–   Category II: selection criteria and indicators which are dependent on the 
   preferences of the CE. One can further differentiate between criteria with 
   high, medium or low relevance for the decision of the CE.
–   Category III: selection criteria which do not depend on the preferences of the 
   CE, but which are relevant for practical purposes, e.g. with regard to the 
   quantification and issuance of reduction credits. Examples hereof are data 
  availability, both on the project and on host country circumstances, and 
  data quality.
    Category-I Criteria can act as threshold criteria. A project that does not 
adequately meet these demands will 
be disqualified from further consid-
eration.  Qualified  projects  will  be 
evaluated  in  detail  and  compared 
with  one  another.  This  constitutes 
the basis for project selection by the 
compensating  entity.  The  selection 
process can broadly be illustrated in 
Figure 7.
    Due  to  their  special  standing, 
the  three  parameters  costs  of  com-
pensation, project type and location, and certificate regime will be discussed 
in more detail. The common feature is their overriding importance on subse-
quent aspects, which can make them predetermining parameters.
    Costs of compensation
    The  parameter  of  certificate  price  [€/t  CO2-eq]  can  be  applied  both  as   
an exogenous ramification and as a selection criterion. In the following, it   
will be interpreted in both ways: as a selection criterion up to a pre-defined 
2.4.2 |  Hierarchy of selection criteria
11   One response option would be to construct 
categories of “typical compensating entities” with 
responding preference lists. It must be questioned, 
however, if practical demands of compensating 
entities could appropriately be reflected by such 
standard categories. Therefore, a more flexible 
methodology is proposed, also see chapter 2.4.3.























Risk profile of host country
Institutional situation in host country
Existing contacts to operators/partners of 
compensation project




Timing  of  delivery  of 
emission reductions
Table 7: Selection criteria 
and indicators30
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price limit. Once the price exceeds the threshold, it acts as a disqualifying   
parameter.
    Project type and location
    These parameters may (but do not have to) constitute exogenous ramifi-
cations due to the preference of the compensating entity.
    Certificate regime
    The choice for or against a certificate category will influence the regula-
tive requirements on the compensation project, or – vice versa – will exclude 
some projects/project types as they are not eligible under the given regime. For 
example, any decision for Gold Standard CERs will exclude LULUCF projects. A 
decision for regular CERs will pose additionality requirements on the project 
according to the standard CDM rules. 
    Basically, there are two options on how to handle this aspect. The first is 
to apply it as an exogenous ramification; the second is to use it as a (less rele-
vant) selection criterion. In any case, it must be checked whether the project 
under consideration would be able to meet the requirements of the relevant 
regulations.
    Within the proposed methodology for project selection, these three pa-
rameters can be applied as Category-I Criteria, if the compensating entity so 
wishes. However, it will also have the option to classify those parameters as 
endogenous. Details can be found in the next chapter.
    In  the  following,  implica-
tions of the choice of the underlying 
regulative regime are illustrated. As 
mentioned above, this choice will in-
fluence the demands on the project. 
If self-developed standards are cho-
sen (resulting in VERs), no interna-
tional standards have to be consid-
ered. If JI First Track or GIS schemes 
are chosen, requirements primarily 
depend on the negotiations between 
host country and compensation en-
tity. For JI Second Track projects, de-
tailed  rules  and  requirements  still 
need to be defined on the interna-
tional level. CDM projects will have 
to fulfil requirements with regard to 
baseline development, additionality, 
and contribution to sustainable de-
velopment.  For  Gold  Standard 
projects,  similar  but  stricter  de-
mands are relevant as in the case of 
“regular” CDM apply. 
    To conclude, only if a com-
pensating entity chooses self-devel-
oped standards/VERs, international 
rules do not need to be considered. 





Project type and location































Figure 8: Implications of decision 
for VERs versus CERs/ERUs31
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    In order to account for individual preferences of compensating entities, a 
weighting of selection criteria is proposed. The underlying idea is that the 
compensating entity states its personal preferences for Category-II Criteria – 
e.g. demand on marketing effects, positive effects on sustainable development 
or the environment – which then constitute the basis for project selection. 
    Within this approach, a five-level scale is proposed. The compensation 
entity can define its personal relevance for each Category-II Criterion accord-
ing  to  the  scale  presented  below.  Category-I  Criteria  can  additionally  be 
weighted with the factor 5, which then have a disqualifying character.
    Most of the indicators listed in Table 7 are of a qualitative nature; a few 
indicators – reduced air/water/soil pollution, price of certificates and project 
start date – are quantitative ones. With regard to the selection process, a (par-
tial) quantification of the qualitative indicators is necessary. One approach 
hereof is to specify the gap between real project characteristics and the theo-
retical optimum for each indicator. A project that perfectly meets a certain 
indicator x1 would receive a score of s1 = S1 for this indicator, while a project that 
fails to meet the requirement of indicator x1 obtains a score of s1 = 0. The max-
imum value of Sn depends on the indicator under consideration. Details are 
provided in Table 9. The performance of a project with regard to a given indica-
tor should be based on expert judgement. 
    The overall rating (R) of a given project (Pm) is then determined by the 
sum of the achieved scores for all indicators (Sn), all of which are weighted ac-
cording to the compensating entities value system/priorities (wn).
  n 
RPm = ∑   (wn *Sn)
n=1
    It must be noted that values for Sn also have a weighting function and 
therefore should be chosen carefully. Compensating entities that do have the 
expertise and time to set indicator values for their case would be free to do so. 
However, in many cases it can be assumed that one would expect too much 
from a compensating entity. Since it will define the values of the aggregated 
weighting scores wn (see chapter 2.4.3), its preferences clearly are considered. 
    Table 9 summarises the proposed values for Sn – differentiated by indica-
tor and performance of a project – which will be used for the purpose of this 
paper. Dark shaded rows represent Category-II criteria, unshaded rows Catego-
ry-I/-III criteria. The values given in Table 9 should be interpreted as a pro-
posal by the author. They are based on best knowledge on CDM project evalu-
ations while striving for a large degree of standardisation, but certainly reflect 
the author’s personal value system to a certain extent. 
    The objective is to standardise the maximum score for each selection cri-
terion to 1.0. Two exceptions were made: the criterion “compensation of GHG 
emissions” has a maximum score of 2.0 (delivery of real reductions max. 1.0 + 
project start date max. 0.5 + external verification max. 0.5). This results from 
2.4.3 |  Weighted evaluation of selection criteria
Table 8: Weighting factors wn
Weighting 














* The project will be disqualiﬁed from further consideration, if requirement is not fulﬁlled in a satisfactory manner.
2.4.4 |  Quantification of qualitative indicators32
HWWI Research  |  Report No. 1  
by the HWWI Research Programme International Climate Policy
the assumption that the compensation of GHG emissions is of significant im-
portance for the compensating entity, regardless of its underlying drivers (also 
see chapter 2.1). Second, a negative scoring is possible for the criteria “environ-
mental effects of the project activity”, “economic benefits (marketing/image)” 
and “situation in host country” in order to allow consideration of negative as-
pects as well.
Selection criterion Indicator Proposed scoring S
Certiﬁcation regime
Fulﬁlment of requirements of 
relevant regulations
0.0 - 1.0
success probability for accreditation
Project type
E.g. small scale, 
renewable energy, etc.
0.0 or 1.0
Project location Preferred country 0.0 or 1.0
Certiﬁcate costs Threshold costs 0.0 or 1.0
Compensation of 
GHG emissions
Delivery of real emission 
reductions
0.0 – 1.0




commencement of operation ahead/
during/after accreditation process
External veriﬁcation
0.0 – no external veriﬁcation is conducted
0.5 – external veriﬁcation is conducted
Environmental effects
of the project activity on:
• local air quality
-0.25 – 0.25
scope of negative or positive effect
• soil quality
-0.25 – 0.25
scope of negative or positive effect
• water quality
-0.25 – 0.25
scope of negative or positive effect
• biodiversity / habitat
-0.25 – 0.25




SD criteria are met
0.0 – 0.5
if no/general/host-country speciﬁc SD-
criteria are met*
Transfer of (innovative) 
technology
0.0 – 0.3
depending on scope of technology transfer
Effects  on  international  trade, 
market access, etc.
0.0 – 0.2
signiﬁcance of positive effects
Economic beneﬁts
(image/marketing)
Credibility  -0.5 – 0.5
Visualisation to public -0.5 – 0.5
Situation in 
host country
Risk proﬁle of host country
-0.4 – 0.4
relative risk proﬁle of host countries under 
consideration, for details see Annex I
Institutional  situation  in  host 
country
0.0 – insufﬁcient situation
0.3 – sufﬁcient situation (sliding scale)
Existing contacts to partners of 
CE
0.0 – no contacts
0.3 – good contacts (sliding scale)
Other project risks No/few risks 0.0 – 1.0
Quantity of emission 
reductions generated
0.5 – generation lower than demand
1.0 – generation equal to or higher than 
demand
Data availability and quality 0.0 – 1.0
* If no SD criteria are deﬁned by the host country but project meets general SD criteria, a scoring of 0.5 results 
    An adaptation of the proposed matrix is possible in order to consider fur-
ther specific requirements of the compensating entity.
    In this section, a methodology for the selection of compensation projects 
has been proposed. Its major features are the categorisation of project param-
eters in three categories, some of which can have a disqualifying character 
Table 9: Proposed scoring of 
quantitative indicators (Sn)
2.4.5 |  Summary33
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while others are weighted according to the compensating entities preferences. 
Selection criteria are substantiated by one or several indicators. Qualitative 
indicators will be quantified on the basis of relative performance and are 
scored with a range of 0.0-1.0. The evaluation of projects is then based on total 
scorings for all selection criteria (as sum of indicator scores); each multiplied 
by the relevant weighting factor. 
    Take the following example, which only accounts for the criteria “com-
pensation of GHG emissions” and “other positive environmental effects”. The 
compensating entity weighted the first criterion with 4, the second with 2. The 
project’s performance on each indicator was determined by expert judgement 
as indicated in the table below. Multiplying each indicator’s performance with 
the compensating entities’ preference results in its weighted evaluation (WE 
Indicator). The weighted evaluation of a criterion (WE Criterion) is calculated 




































• air quality 0.25 0 0.0
0.5
• soil quality 0.25 0.25 0.5
• water quality 0.25 0 0.0
• biodiversity, 
   and habitat 0.25 0 0.0
Total scoring 2.7 2.7
    The proposed concept will be tested with the case studies in section 3.4.34
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    In late 2002, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH formulated the objective to become a “CO2 neutral” operation. The 
GTZ is an internationally active organisation with its headquarter located in 
Eschborn/Germany. Major causes of GHG emissions are the extensive travel-
ling activities of its employees as well as energy consumption in offices (elec-
tricity and heat). Several initiatives to reduce environmental impacts had 
been conducted, inter alia consumption of electricity from renewable energy 
sources, incentives to commute by public transportation or bikes, renovation 
of offices based on low-energy standards and the reduction of travelling ac-
tivities by means of video conferences. However, the environmental balance 
sheet indicated that climate impacts remain. For 2003, a total of 10,742 t CO2 
(direct emissions) resulted from space heating (1,799 t CO2), commuting (2,721 t 
CO2), and national (394 t CO2) and international (5,828 t CO2) travelling activi-
ties (Wolf, 2004).
    These emissions – plus a safety margin – were to be neutralized by a GHG-
compensation project. The GTZ was to select an appropriate compensation 
project on the basis of short project descriptions, so-called project idea notes 
(PINs), and then to buy an option on the generated reduction certificates. 
Project planning, financing and implementation were to be conducted by 
third parties, i.e. the GTZ would not be involved in the physical project activity.
    The GTZ defined several requirements for an appropriate compensation 
project. These are:
–   certified emission reductions,
–   certification regime ((bilateral) CDM),
–   project “size” (preferably small-scale),
–   project type (preferably renewable energy project),
–   quality aspect (“high-quality”, potentially Gold Standard).
    With regard to the driver categories identified in chapter 2.1, the GTZ can 
thus be assumed to be driven primarily by environmental and social aspects 
(“moral responsibility”). Certification requirements for CDM and potentially 
Gold Standard need to be fulfilled by the compensation project. If the project 
falls under the category of small scale, the simplified UNFCCC regulations can 
be applied.
    According to these relatively broad preference statements, the author as-
sumed preference scores wn for each selection criterion. It must be noted that 
the values of wn were not defined by the GTZ, thus they cannot be seen as an 
explicit GTZ position. Assumed values for wn are summarized in Table 10.
3 |  Case studies
3.1  |  Background
3.2  |  Requirements of the compensating entity35
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GTZ CE Preference Selection criterion Indicator
Category I
5
Certiﬁcation regime Success probability for accre-
didation as CDM project
4
Certiﬁcation regime II Small  Scale  project  and/or 
Gold Standard project
3 Project type Renewable Energy Project
0 Project location





Delivery of real emission re-





Environmental effects • air quality
• soil quality
• water quality
• biodiversity, and habitat
3
Contribution  to  sustainable 
development
SD criteria are met
Transfer of (innovative) tech-
nologies
International  trade,  market 
access, etc.
2








Situation in host country Risk proﬁle of host country
Institutional situation in host 
country
Existing contacts
2 Other project risks No/few risks
1
Quantity  of  emission  reduc-
tions generated
Category III 2 Data availability and quality
    Please note that a second row on certificate regime(s) has been added to 
allow inclusion of Gold Standard and Small Scale – eligibility. The methodol-
ogy for the evaluation of the host countries’ risk profiles is described in Annex I.
    Before applying the selection concept to the case-studies, this chapter 
summarises the latest CDM rules with a focus on eligibility requirements. 
They are of outstanding importance for the underlying case, because the GTZ 
explicitly selected the CDM as the underlying certificate regime. Consequent-
ly, the success chances of a given project to be accredited as a CDM project will 
be crucial. The major aspects are: 
–   the additionality of the project,
–   (no) involvement of Official Development Assistance,
–   eligibility of the host country,
–   regulations for baseline establishment.
    Additionality Assessment
    The major objective of the additionality assessment is to show that the 
project activity would not have occurred anyway, e.g. because of its economical 
Table 10: Assumed weighting 
scores wn for the GTZ
3.3  |  Review: Major regulations for CDM projects36
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attractiveness. On its 16th meeting, the CDM EB passed the “Consolidated Ad-
ditionality Test” for CDM projects. It constitutes a tool for the demonstration 
and assessment of a project’s additionality, which is not mandatory but should 
facilitate the additionality determination. The additionality test consists of 
several steps, namely:
–   the identification of alternatives to the project activity,
–   an investment analysis to determine that the proposed project activity is     
     not the most economically or financially attractive,
–   a barrier analysis (if results of step 2 are unconvincing),
–   a common practice analysis,
–   a discussion of the impact of CDM accreditation.
    Further details can be found in Annex 1 of the Report of the 16th meeting 
of the CDM EB (UNFCCC, 2004). The Additionality Tool provides some guidance 
on the individual steps, but does not provide reference figures, e.g. on accept-
able Internal Rates of Return (IRR). Individual circumstances of the potential 
project need to be considered. 
    For Small Scale Projects, a simplified additionality assessment – a barrier 
analysis – can be applied. The procedure is defined in attachment A to appen-
dix B of the Small Scale Rules (UNFCCC, 2003). Investment barriers, techno-
logical  barriers/risks/uncertainties,  barriers  due  to  prevailing  practice  or   
other types of barriers can be used for explanation. It must be shown that al-
ternatives to the project would have led to higher emissions.
 
    Official Development Assistance in the CDM
    According to the decisions of the UNFCCC (Decision 17/CP.7), the CDM 
shall not lead to a diversion of Official Development Assistance (ODA). As is 
often the case in the international climate policy regime, the term “diversion” 
is not clearly defined. Dutschke et al. (2003) discuss different possible interpre-
tations. These are: diversion of purpose, financial diversion, sectoral diversion, 
and regional diversion. So far, development assistance programmes in many 
countries have played a crucial role with regard to awareness-raising and CDM 
capacity building. Such support seems eligible under the CDM rules. The deci-
sive practical questions are: “How much ODA is allowed and for which pur-
poses?”, and “How can diversion be detected?”. As Dutschke et al. point out “it 
is not controversial today that ODA operates in the field of CDM institution and 
capacity building, like in the case of the World Bank initiated National Strat-
egy Studies (NSS). These activities are financed on a bilateral basis and create 
the framework for successful project implementation. One result of these stud-
ies is a CDM project pipeline. The development of complete project documents 
is only one step further, which is actually undertaken by cooperation agencies 
of several countries (e.g. Canada and Germany), but this effectively moves into 
a grey zone where ODA might subsidise implementation.” (Dutschke et al., 
2003, p. 4) 
    If ODA is involved in a concrete project activity, the CDM EB has to decide 
on its eligibility. So far, there is no precedent. In any case, direct ODA involve-
ment can be expected to decrease a project’s chance for accreditation.
    Host Country Eligibility
    The potential host country must have ratified the Kyoto Protocol in order 
to be eligible for the CDM. This seemingly trivial formality had a political mo-
mentum until fall 2004. Several Non-Annex-I countries especially from OPEC 37
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did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol as long as Russia had not done so. Algeria is 
an example hereof. The Algerian President Bouteflika ratified the Kyoto Proto-
col in June 2004, but the ratification document was not sent to the UNFCCC – 
explained by the outstanding ratification of Russia (Wolf 2004a, Michaelowa 
2005a). 
    Host country governments can decide which projects are eligible as CDM 
projects  and  which  to  be  forwarded  to  the  CDM  EB  for  registration.  The   
approval decision is made by the formal national CDM body, the so-called   
Designated National Authority (DNA), and has to be notified to the UNFCC 
Secretariat. Thus, the existence of a formal DNA should be considered as well. 
A DNA can set eligibility criteria for CDM projects. Examples hereof are the 
definition of sustainability criteria, the exclusion of certain project types, or 
the definition of “national priority lists” as in the case of China (Butzengeiger/
Michaelowa, 2005). 
 
    Regulations on baseline establishment
    According to Paragraph 48 of the Marrakech Accords (Annex I, Section J), 
project developers may choose from amongst three baseline approaches “the 
one deemed most appropriate for the project activity, taking into account any 
guidance by the executive board, and justify the appropriateness of their 
choice: 
a) existing actual or historical emissions, as applicable; or
b) emissions from a technology that represents an economically attractive  
  course of action, taking into account barriers to investment; or
c)  the average emissions of similar project activities undertaken in the pre- 
  vious five years, in similar social, economic, environmental and techno- 
  logical circumstances, and whose performance is among the top  20 per cent   
  of their category.” (UNFCCC 2001, p. 79)
    On the basis of these approaches, project developers have to submit pro-
posals for a baseline methodology for the project under consideration unless 
an applicable methodology already exists (UNFFC, 2005b). Doing so, project de-
velopers also have to explain how the methodology demonstrates that a project 
activity is additional and therefore not the baseline scenario (UNFCCC, 2003a, 
p. 1). Submitted proposals are open for public comments and are evaluated by 
the so-called Methodology Panel and the CDM EB itself. While the Methodology 
Panel expresses recommendations to the CDM EB, the latter has the authority 
to approve proposed methodologies. After a slow start in 2003, 21 methodolo-
gies had been approved by the CDM EB by April 2005 (UNFCCC, 2005b).
    One has to be aware that the selection criterion “success probability for 
accreditation under the chosen regime” will be influenced by far more than 
the above described issues. A case-by-case analysis is necessary to consider all 
of the manifold facets of the CDM. Expert judgment is recommended to ensure 
consideration of all relevant aspects and consistent entries into the selection matrix.
    The  selection  methodology  developed  in  section  2  will  be  tested  at   
several case studies in the following paragraphs. Over 30 project idea notes 
have been submitted to the GTZ. For the purpose of the analysis, five of the 
more substantial project ideas were selected randomly. These are: 
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–   a hydro power project in India,
–   a wind energy project in northern Africa,
–   a landfill gas project in northern Africa,
–   a biological waste water treatment plant in South East Asia,
–   an industrial fuel-switch project in South America.
    The names of projects, involved project participants as well the exact lo-
cations are kept anonymous. The analysis is conducted on the basis of submit-
ted PINs. Data, figures and assumptions in these documentations are not ques-
tioned within the scope of this study as long as there is no clear mistake/ 
misinformation. Where appropriate, further background information on ap-
plied technologies etc. is added by the author. Neither technical feasibilities of 
the project ideas nor construction details are reviewed. For practical purposes, 
this would be of central relevance.
    As a first step, major characteristics of each project are summarised. 
Thereafter, the performance of each project with regard to the selection crite-
ria is discussed. Results will be summarized in matrices, which finally allow 
a project ranking. Thus, the relative project performance under the value   
system of the GTZ is compared. In general terms, the ranking constitutes the 
basis for project selection by a compensating entity. 
     Project overview
    The proposed project is a hydroelectric power project in Karnataka state, 
India. It is a run-of-river utility with a total electric capacity of about 10 MW, 
being made out of three generation units. The plant consists of a diversion 
structure, a power canal of about 2000 m length, three penstocks, turbines, a 
power house, switch yard, tail race and a tail race canal. Generated electricity 
is supposed to be fed into the grid of the regional power transmission corpora-
tion. Therefore, a step-up of the voltage level is necessary. 
    A plant load factor of about 35% is expected, leading to an expected an-
nual electricity generation of about 31,000 MWh.
    Evaluation of project characteristics with regard to selection criteria
    Certification regime(s)
    The underlying project is a renewable energy project that fulfils the def-
initions of small scale projects according to CDM regulations. There, the cate-
gory I.D – “Renewable Electricity Generation for the Grid” –  applies. The project 
also has a very good potential to be accredited as a Gold Standard project. A 
stakeholder consultation process has been initiated in 2004 and, so far, no ob-
jections were raised. The nearby village issued the formally required “certifi-
cate of no-objection”. With regard to an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA), it is referred that no EIA has to be conducted according to Indian regula-
tions because of the small scale character of the project activity. A “rapid EIA” 
had been conducted, which “did not indicate any negative impacts on air, wa-
ter, soil and habitations”. It must also be noted that no extensive EIA has to be 
conducted to achieve Gold Standard Status because of the small scale charac-
ter of the project (Sterk/Langrock, 2003, p. 10). 
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Project type and location
    Renewable energy project, Non-Annex-I Country.
   
Compensation of GHG emissions
    Reasonability of the baseline: the project developers propose the weight-
ed average generation mix12 in Karnataka State as the baseline, resulting in an 
emissions factor of 753 kg CO2/MWh. Data of the Government of India (2003a) 
suggests that the order of magnitude is correct: in 2000-01, the weighted aver-
age emissions factor of the Karnataka State grid was 751 kg/MWh. However, it 
might  be  questioned  as  to  whether  the  chosen  baseline  boundary  (state 
boundaries of Karnataka) is appropriate. It might be reasonable to choose a 
wider baseline boundary, if inter-state transmission is relevant. The emissions 
factor for the “Southern Region of India” was 695 kg/MWh in 2001-02 accord-
ing to the Government of India (2003a).
    Additionality of the project activity: The project has an IRR of 14%, while 
typical interest rates on loans in the region are between 11.75 and 13.0%. A pay-
back period of 8 years is indicated. Additionally, several barriers were identi-
fied; namely hydrology risks, geology risks, transmission risks, lack of infra-
structure, and institutional barriers. The practical relevance of some of these 
barriers might be questioned. However, since the project would apply accord-
ing to small scale rules, a simplified additionality assessment – and thus the 
identification of at least one barrier – is sufficient. 
    With regard to political/legal additionality, one should recognize that 
India formulated the objective to increase renewable energy power produc-
tion to 10% of new capacity until 2012 – and that there is still a long way to go. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that no adequate incentives are provided 
by the Indian Government and that there are no negative implications for the 
project’s additionality. As no public funding is involved, ODA additionality of 
the project can be assumed.
    Project start date: The first draft of the PIN/PDD had been submitted in 
March 2004, while the project design phase started in October 2002. Clear-
ances and formal approvals had been obtained by March 2003, the financial 
closure and land acquisition by June 2003. The power purchase agreement 
(PPA) with the regional transmission company was signed on September 15th 
2003. Operation was expected to start in December 2004. The draft-PDD con-
tains evidence that additional income through the CDM was considered by the 
project participants – but only since 2003. As the project design phase started 
in October 2002, this is a weak argument. The intended project duration is 30 
years, the crediting period 10 years.
    External verification: will be conducted as part of the CDM cycle.
    To conclude, it can be assumed that the project’s chances for formal   
approval are quite good, whereas the practical additionality must be ques-
tioned.
    Environmental impacts
    The project will not lead to a significant reduction of local air pollutants, 
since it is a Greenfield project and since nearby villages are already connected 
to the electricity grid. According to the baseline scenario, air pollution will be 
reduced on a regional scale (assumption of alternative power generation in 
fossil fuel fired power plants). 
    The project documentation does not contain information on negative 
12  Mix of thermal, hydro and nuclear power. Wind 
energy power is not considered.40
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impacts on habitats, water based populations or regional water balances. Since 
there is no diversion of the regional water balance, the impact on the regional 
water balance might be low. The former potential impacts should be analysed 
further. In this regard, the remaining minimum water level could be an ap-
propriate indicator. 
 
    Contribution to sustainable development
    The project activity does not lead to a transfer of technology – small hy-
dro power plants are common practice in the region. However, the project can 
be assumed to have positive effects on local/regional infrastructure develop-
ment, employment during construction and operation (35 permanent employ-
ees are envisaged), availability of electrical power and thus an increase of liv-
ing-standards in the rural area13 .
    Costs of compensation
    Indication US$ 5 per CER; the price is subject to negotiation.
    Economic benefits for the compensating entity
    The project is characterised by a good image and it is easy to understand/
communicate. 
    Situation in host country
    India ratified (accessed) the Kyoto Protocol on 26th August 2002. The Min-
istry of Environment and Forests is the Designated National Authority for 
CDM projects. It has formulated interim guidelines for CDM and sustainable 
development demands. The overall institutional CDM situation in India can 
be considered excellent. Several CDM capacity building programmes have 
been conducted in India in the past. The above-mentioned baseline study of 
the Indian Government is a good indicator of its supportive attitude toward 
the CDM. Direct contacts to host country partners exist.









India 53.0 4 2.8 (rank 83)
* For comparison: Switzerland = 95.2, Germany = 92.4, Argentina = 22.2
** 1 = lowest risk category, 7 = highest risk category
*** Finland: rank 1 (Score 9.7), Germany: rank 16 (Score 7.7)
    Quantity of emission reductions generated 
    Up to 23,000 t CO2/year (for an optimal year in terms of water availability).
    Other project risks
    Major project risks include limited water availability (dependency on 
monsoons; year-around operation is not possible) and the financial capabili-
ties maintenance of the power purchase agreement (PPA). A PPA has been ne-
gotiated for 12 years. However, the financial standing of the purchaser is 
poor.
    Data availability and quality
    Very good, both with regard to the project activity and national/regional 
background information.
Country Risk Evaluation – Key Indicators
13  The issue of suppressed demand 
 will not be discussed here.41
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    Project overview
    The proposed compensation project is the installation of a wind park in 
Algeria. Ten wind turbines are to be installed, resulting in a total capacity of 
10-13 MW. Based on wind speed analyses, an annual electricity generation of 
approximately 22,000 MWh is expected. Generated electricity is supposed to 
replace electricity from a nearby diesel fuelled installation (assuming that the 
region is not connected to the national electricity grid).
    Evaluation of project characteristics with regard to selection criteria
    Certification regime(s)
    The project fulfils the definitions of small scale projects according to 
CDM regulations (installed capacity less than 15 MW). There, the category I.D 
– “Renewable Electricity Generation for the Grid” – applies. The project also has 
the potential to become accredited as a Gold Standard project. However, a pub-
lic consultation process would have to be conducted. No public funds are in-
volved in the project activity, thus a conflict with ODA additionality can be 
excluded.
    Project type and location
    Renewable energy project in the Saharan Region, Algeria (Non-Annex-I). 
The project location is a destination for regional and international tourism, 
which makes the project suitable as a “demonstration project”.
    Compensation of GHG emissions
    Reasonability of the baseline: a comprehensive baseline still has to be 
developed. The project developers argue that the project activity replaces elec-
tricity from a nearby diesel fuelled installation (decentralized electricity gen-
eration). An emissions factor of 890 kg CO2/MWh is assumed. If the area is 
connected to the national grid, however, one would need to consider the emis-
sions factor of the latter. According to the statistics of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 2004), the Algerian emissions factor for heat and electricity gen-
eration was 697 kg CO2/MWh in 2004. The effective emissions factor for pure 
electricity generation will be somewhat higher. The choice of the emissions 
factor significantly influences the total amount of CERs that can be expected 
by the project activity.
    Additionality of the project activity: Algeria formulated the objective to 
generate 10% of its energy demand from renewable energies in 2020. There are 
no binding policies yet, which force utilities to generate a minimum share by 
means of renewable energies. However, the Algerian legislator recently initi-
ated several acts to promote renewable energies in the country. A decree on 
diversification of power production costs was enacted on 25th of March 2004 
(Khelil, 2004). The renewable energy law will also entail a purchase obligation 
as well as a feed-in-tariff for renewable energy electricity of 9 ct/kWh. This 
feed-in-tariff will be considered in the following additionality assessment. 
    As the project is a small scale project, the simplified additionality assess-
ment can be applied. Income streams of the project strongly depend on the 
generated electricity and thus the effective wind speed. However, no long-
term measurements exist for the exact project location. The analysis of finan-
cial data indicated a payback period of 4.5 to 9 years depending on the effective 
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wind yield. Detailed results of the sensitivity analysis can be found in Annex 
II. A potential barrier against project implementation is the political situation 
in the country. No ODA funds are involved.
    Project start date: The PIN was submitted to the GTZ in November 2003. 
At that time, the project was in the very early design phase: wind yield studies 
still were to be conducted and the concrete technology (wind turbines) still had 
to be selected. The earliest possible implementation/start date was indicated 
for late 2004/early 2005. Consequently, one can assume that revenues from the 
CDM had been considered by project developers from the beginning.
    External verification: will be conducted as part of the CDM cycle.
    Environmental impacts
    Compared with the baseline scenario of electricity generation by a diesel 
fuelled installation, electricity generation by wind power leads to a reduction 
of local air pollutants: up to 130 tons sulphur dioxide (SO2), 50 tons nitrous mon-
oxide (NO), 16 tons carbon monoxide (CO) and 4 tons of dust/particles can be 
avoided annually (assumption of 22,000 MWh electricity generation per year). 
The wind park will be installed in an area characterized by a low population 
density. Hence, few problems with regard to complaints from residents can be 
expected.
    Contribution to sustainable development
    Algeria’s energy system is traditionally characterised by gas- and oil-
based electricity generation. In 2002, 59.1% of electricity, which has been re-
tailed by state-owned Sonel Gaz, had been generated using oil, 39.4% by using 
gas, 1.3% by using diesel and 0.2% by hydro power (Sonel Gaz, 2003). In total, 
99.8% of electricity has been generated by conventional thermal sources (EIA, 
2005). The government’s objective to meet 10% of the national energy demand 
by renewable energies in 2020 still needs to be implemented. The project has 
the potential to become the national demonstration project for wind power 
generation, since no comparable project seems to exist in Algeria. 
    With regard to maintenance, two Algerian employees will be trained in 
Germany for 4 months and thereafter, are responsible for the installations. 
Thus, not only technology, but also some technical know-how is “transferred” 
to the host country (one might of course question the long-term benefits that 
effectively result from this transfer, but this issue is not the focus here).
    Costs of compensation
    No certificate price has been indicated; it is subject to negotiation.
    Economic benefits for the compensating entity
    The project is characterised by a solid image and it is easy to understand/
communicate. 
    Situation in host country
    The Algerian President internally passed the ratification document of 
the Kyoto Protocol in June 2004, and the document was submitted to the UN-
FCCC on February 16th 2005. Algeria is currently in the process of setting up a 
DNA, which so far has not been notified to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2005/2005a). 
Eligibility criteria for the CDM and/or sustainability criteria have not yet been 
defined either. Direct contacts to host country partners exist.44
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Algeria 40.2 4 2.6 (rank 88)
* For comparison: Switzerland = 95.2, Germany = 92.4, Argentina = 22.2
** 1 = lowest risk category, 7 = highest risk category
*** Finland: rank 1 (Score 9.7), Germany: rank 16 (Score 7.7)
    Quantity of emission reductions generated 
    The amount of generated CERs strongly depends on the annual wind 
yield. Under the assumption of an electricity generation of 20,000 MWh/y and 
a diesel fuelled reference installation, 17,800 CERs/y are generated (13,600 CERs 
for the average grid emissions factor, IEA). If electricity generation amounts to 
22,000 MWh/y, 19,590 CERs (14,960 CERs respectively) result. 
    Other project risks
    The major uncertainty factor is the wind yield. The PIN does not contain 
information on whether there is prospect for a power purchase agreement. 
Based on the background of the Algerian feed-in-law, it can be assumed that a 
PPA can be negotiated without substantial problems. 
    Data availability and quality
    Information on characteristics of the national energy system is suffi-
ciently available; some further information on the project activity has to be 
gathered.
Country Risk Evaluation – Key Indicators45
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    Project overview
    The proposed installation of a re-utilization system for a landfill in Tuni-
sia aims at the elimination of methane emissions by gas collection and (po-
tentially) re-utilization. If the methane content of the landfill gas is sufficient, 
electricity will be generated by small combined heat and power installation(s) 
with an electrical capacity of about 0,5 MW each. Details depend on the qual-
ity and quantity of the landfill gas. The latter is created by biochemical decom-
position of the organic parts of solid household commercial waste that is dis-
posed. About 65% of the disposed waste is biodegradable. So far, the landfill 
gas is released into the atmosphere. It typically contains 45-60% methane 
(WFAU, 2003), which has a global warming potential of 21. The project activity 
includes the establishment of a surface and lateral surface sealing and the 
installation of wells to vacuum the landfill gas.
    GHG-emissions are reduced by two effects: methane is thermally oxi-
dised and transformed to carbon dioxide with a global warming potential of 
1. Thus, there is a reduction of 20 “global warming units”. In addition, if the gas 
is not only flared but also used for electricity generation, CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation can be reduced elsewhere. Details hereof depend on the 
baseline scenario.
    Evaluation of project characteristics with regard to selection criteria
    Certification regime
    In principal, the project can be accredited as a CDM project. However, 
ODA funds might be involved (see below). The project would also qualify as a 
small scale project (Category III.D - methane recovery and avoidance), if both 
annual emission reductions and direct CO2 emissions are lower than 15,000 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent annually. However, the estimated annual 
reductions are in the range of 33,000-45,000 t CO2-eq per year. The amount of 
emission reductions also varies over time due to fluctuations of the generated 
landfill gas (depending on biological activity and composition/decomposition 
of waste). Since total project emissions are larger than 15,000 tons/year, it is 
assumed that the project does not quality for the small scale category14. The 
project would qualify for the Gold Standard – category “Ecologically sound 
biomass, biogas and liquid biofuels (heat, electricity, co-generation)” – only 
partially and under the precondition that electricity indeed is generated (Sch-
lup, 2005). Since the latter is not certain yet, non-eligibility is assumed in the 
following. 
    Project type and location
    Landfill gas utilisation, Tunisia
    Compensation of GHG emissions
    Reasonability  of  the  baseline:  The  proposed  baseline  with  regard  to 
methane transformation is reasonable. A solid monitoring of the effective 
methane content is necessary, especially if no electricity generation is involved 
(backwards calculation on the basis of relative heating values of methane and 
carbon dioxide). If electricity generation is involved, a reasonable emissions 
factor has to be applied. Since it is intended to feed electricity into the na-
tional grid, the average national emissions factor could be applied. In 2002, 
3.4.3 |  Landfill gas project in North Africa
14  It must be noted that such cases are discussed   
on the contrary by CDM experts on the basis of 
guidance UNFCCC 2002 (Michaelowa 2005a); a   
final decision by the CDM EB is still pending.47
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average CO2 emissions per MWh from electricity and heat generation amount-
ed to 567 g (IEA, 2004). The effective emissions factor for pure electricity gen-
eration will be somewhat higher.
    Additionality of the project activity: If the project only covers the collec-
tion and flaring of landfill gas without electricity generation, investment ad-
ditionality is given. If, however, the gas analysis reveals that electricity gen-
eration  is  feasible,  costs  and  income  of  the  combined  heat  and  power 
installations (CHP) need to be considered. The project proposal does not entail 
detailed financial data that would allow the application of the CDM EB’s ad-
ditionality tool. Project developers indicated that they strive for a payback pe-
riod of less than seven years. There obviously is dispute on the feed-in-tariff 
for generated electricity: the grid operator offered a price which is 66% of what 
the project developer considers necessary. Significant political barriers cannot 
be expected since the Tunisian government actively supports the project ac-
tivity and already initiated a public tender. A critical aspect is the potential 
involvement of GEF funds to bear incremental costs of the project. In this case, 
direct ODA funds would be involved – which significantly reduces the project’s 
chances for accreditation at the CDM EB.
    Project start date: Project developers proved that income from the CDM 
was considered from the beginning of project planning.
    External verification: will be conducted as part of the CDM cycle.
    Other positive or negative environmental impacts
    Reduction of odours that might bother the local population.
    Contribution to sustainable development
    The project contributes to sustainable development as it supports the   
utilization of ecologically sound energy sources. The Tunisian government de-
clared landfill gas utilization as being of “national interest”. Technology trans-
fer is involved to a certain extent.
    Costs of compensation
    No certificate price has been indicated.
    Economic benefits for the compensating entity
    The manner of GHG reduction is somewhat complex; landfills do not 
have a very good/positive image.
    Situation in host country
    Tunisia  ratified  (accessed)  the  Kyoto  Protocol  on  January  22nd,  2003.   
The  country  has  not  yet  notified  a  DNA  to  the  UNFCCC  (UNFCCC  2005a).   
Eligibility criteria for the CDM and/or sustainability criteria have also not 
been defined yet. 
    Direct contacts to host country partners exist.









Tunisia 55.1 3 4.9 (rank 39)
* For comparison: Switzerland = 95.2, Germany = 92.4, Argentina = 22.2
** 1 = lowest risk category, 7 = highest risk category
*** Finland: rank 1 (Score 9.7), Germany: rank 16 (Score 7.7)
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    Quantity of emission reductions generated 
    33,000-45,000 t CO2-eq only for methane transformation/destruction. 
    Other project risks
    Changes  in  composition  of  disposed  waste,  e.g.  reduction  of  organic 
shares.  Decrease  of  regional  precipitation,  which  would  reduce  biological   
activity (dependence on H2O) and thus the amount of biogas available for elec-
tricity generation.
    Data availability and quality
    Moderate  data  availability  and  quality  with  regard  to  the  project’s   
finances is rather poor.49
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    Project overview
    The  proposed  project  covers  an  adapted  treatment  system  of  waste- 
water from slaughterhouses and the utilization of collected biogas for the   
generation  of  heat  and  electricity.  Both  heat  and  electricity  will  be  used   
internally, i.e. there is no electricity exported to the national/regional grid.   
The current waste water treatment system consists of an open anaerobic   
pond and an aeration pond. Methane is emitted continuously from the open 
anaerobic pond.
    The plan of the waste water treatment system includes the installation 
of an anaerobic sludge blanket stirred batch system with a total digester vol-
ume of 4000 m3 and a post treatment system consisting of sand bed filter and 
wetland system. Based on a chemical oxygen demand (COD) of 2.5 kg/m3 and 
a current/future waste water flow of approximately 3,000/6,000 m3/day the 
total daily COD amounts to about 7,500/15,000 kg per day. Under the assump-
tion of an average biogas generation of 5,000 m3/day (results in approximate-
ly 3.2 t CH4/day), annual CH4 reductions of 1,150 t are expected. Considering 
methane’s global warming potential to be 21, about 23,000 t CO2-eq emissions 
per year can be reduced merely by methane destruction. A full-year operation 
of the slaughterhouse is assumed.
    Evaluation of project characteristics with regard to selection criteria
    Certification regime
    The project qualifies for CDM status; given its investment additionality 
is confirmed by the CDM EB. Under the assumption that the project developers 
use a CHP installation to utilize the biogas, the project would qualify under 
category I.C – thermal energy for the user – of the small scale CDM rules: “For 
co-generation systems to qualify under this category, the sum of all forms of 
energy output shall not exceed 45 MWth. E.g., for a biomass based co-generating 
system the rating for the primary boiler shall not exceed 45 MWth.” (UNFCCC, 
2003, p. 7) If this way is chosen, it must be questioned if emission reductions 
from methane recovery can be accounted for. There have been some recent 
project submissions to the CDM EB, applying for two small scale categories. An 
example hereof is the Imbituva Biomass Project in Brazil (Ecosecurities, 2004, 
p.7). However, there is no decision yet on the eligibility of this approach; lead-
ing CDM experts are sceptical in this regard (Michaelowa, 2005a).
    The project’s eligibility for the Gold Standard must be questioned. While 
“ecologically sound” biomass/biogas is principally eligible, it must be expected 
that environmental NGOs will refuse projects with relation to battery farming 
(chicken slaughterhouse) in their Gold Standard project portfolio. 
    Project type and location
    Biogas project, Non-Annex-I country
    Compensation of GHG emissions
    Reasonability of the baseline: As in the case of the Tunisian project, this 
project activity consists of two parts: destruction of methane that tradition-
ally has been released into the atmosphere and the replacement of fossil fuels 
by utilization of the collected biogas. In accordance with the small scale rules, 
the simplified baseline is the fuel consumption of the baseline technologies 
3.4.4 |  Biological waste water treatment plant in South East Asia51
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times the respective emission coefficients for the fossil fuels displaced (in this 
case heavy oil). Emission reductions through electricity displacement are to be 
calculated by multiplying the electricity consumption with the relevant emis-
sion factor. For the methane recovery part, baseline is the amount of methane 
that would be emitted to the atmosphere (UNFCCC 2003, pp. 7, 17). Thus, the 
approach of the project developers can be evaluated as reasonable. A quantifi-
cation of emission reductions due to fuel substitution is not possible as quan-
titative information has not been provided.
    Additionality of the project activity: Financial data has been provided 
sparsely, so a comprehensive analysis is impossible. The biogas system would 
cost about 30 Mio Baht (installation only, no costs for operation and mainte-
nance are given), savings through energy consumption – heavy oil and elec-
tricity – are estimated at 4 Mio Baht per year. Thus, in a best-case scenario (no 
operation and maintenance costs, no discounting; ignorance of costs for CHP), 
the pay back period would be 7.5 years. Investment additionality can thus be 
assumed. ODA funds are not involved in the project activity, finances are pro-
vided 100% by the operator if the installation. Also, there are no binding laws 
that would require operators of slaughterhouses to recover methane from 
waste water treatment installations.
    Project start date: Project developers considered income from the CDM 
from the beginning of project planning. 
    External verification: will be conducted as part of the CDM cycle.
    Other positive or negative environmental impacts
–  Reduction of odours that might bother the local population.
–  Improved  quality  of  waste  water  after  treatment,  which  also  lowers 
  pollutant loads to the river/canal. 
    Contribution to sustainable development
    The proposed project does not involve technology transfer. Technologies 
are provided by a national supplier. However, it is the first time that this tech-
nology is applied in the underlying sector and can thus have demonstrative 
character. The project also contributes to sustainable development as it sup-
ports the utilization of ecologically sound energy sources.
    Costs of compensation
    4 EUR per CER
    Economic benefits for the compensating entity
    The manner of GHG reduction is somewhat complex. The image of the 
project can be negative as it implies acceptance of battery farming (chicken 
slaughterhouse). 
    Situation in host country
    Thailand  ratified  the  Kyoto  Protocol  in  August  2002.  Historically,  its   
attitude towards CDM was not overwhelmingly enthusiastic. This attitude, 
however, has changed over time. Thailand notified its DNA to the UNFCCC in 
June 2004; the approval process for CDM project is complex (Michaelowa, 
2003/2003a). Direct contacts to the project developers and host country repre-
sentatives exist.52
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Thailand 59.5 3 3.3 (rank 75)
* For comparison: Switzerland = 95.2, Germany = 92.4, Argentina = 22.2
** 1 = lowest risk category, 7 = highest risk category
*** Finland: rank 1 (Score 9.7), Germany: rank 16 (Score 7.7)
    Quantity of emission reductions generated 
    Up to 22,000 t CO2-eq depending on the amount of biogas generation; plus 
reduction from fossil fuel consumption.
    Other project risks
    Slow/bad adaptation of microbiology to waste water composition, result-
ing in incomplete/slow biodegradation and generation of biogas (assumed 
eventuality).
    Data availability and quality
    Medium to poor on the project activity, good with regard to the national 
situation.
Country Risk Evaluation – Key Indicators53
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    Project overview
    The proposed project intends to generate emission reduction credits by 
means of fuel-switch in a large brewery in Argentina. Heavy oil will be dis-
placed by sawdust derived from wood processing. The brewery uses two tube 
boilers, with a steam generation capacity of 17.5 t/h at 10 bars each. The oil-fired 
boiler  under  consideration  historically  has  been  kept  as  stand-by  reserve. 
Within the scope of a production increase, the spare boiler will have to be ful-
ly used. Heavy oil consumption is expected to rise to 3,750 t annually. 
    Since enough biomass residues are available in the region, which usually 
are “fired to open air without any profit”, the fuel switch was proposed. A 
technical  adaptation  of  the  boiler  would  be  necessary  to  enable  sawdust   
burning. This would be done by adding a special combustion air-sustained 
system called “torsional chamber”. This technology is in widespread use in 
Latin America. The new aspect is that for the first time in Argentina a plant 
would be using biomass exclusively coming from another process/location. 
The project developers expect this to be “a trigger for being replicated some-
where else”.
    Evaluation of project characteristics with regard to selection criteria
    Certification regime
    If the project could prove its additionality, it will be eligible under the 
CDM (also see additionality discussion below). 
    The project activity does not qualify for category III.B of the Small Scale 
Rules – Switching fossil fuels, because the small scale category is limited to 
fuel-switches from one fossil fuel to another. Nonetheless, the project is eligi-
ble for category I.C – Thermal Energy for the User – of the CDM Small Scale 
Rules, since the threshold of 45 MW installed capacity is not surpassed by the 
boilers (co-fired system according to UNFCCC, 2005c, p. 1). It can also be as-
sumed that the installations directly emit less than 15,000 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent annually.
    Although it is a renewable energy project, it cannot be expected to qual-
ify for the Gold Standard, due to the Gold Standard’s stringent additionality 
requirements.
    Project type and location
    Renewable Energy Project, Non-Annex-I Country
    Compensation of GHG emissions
    Project start date: Project developers considered income of the CDM be-
fore implementation of the project. However, the project implementation time 
is very short: 1 month.
    Additionality of the project activity: ODA funds are not involved. Since 
the project is not eligible for the simplified additionality test for small scale 
projects, the additionality tool of the CDM EB should be applied. Once again, 
only little financial data has been revealed by the project developer, which 
makes a detailed analysis difficult. However, a screening of macro-data clear-
ly showed that the project is economically attractive.
    Investment costs (torsional chamber) were given with US$ 750,000. Cost 
savings through the substitution of heavy oil by sawdust amount to 150 US$ 
3.4.5 |  Industrial fuel-switch project, South America55
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per ton of oil, or 525,000 US$ per year. Thus, the payback period is only 15 
months. To conclude, the project cannot be considered additional.
    Reasonability of the baseline: Since the project is not eligible for the Small 
Scale Simplified Modalities, baseline rules for regular CDM projects have to be 
applied. As mentioned above, there is the choice between the baseline ap-
proaches “existing actual or historical emissions” (Paragraph 48a), “average of 
similar project’s emissions” (Paragraph 48b) and “economically attractive al-
ternative” (Paragraph 48c). The project developer argued for option 48a – the 
continuation of the status quo in terms of relative emissions. Without going 
too far into the details of baseline establishment, this approach poses two 
problems. First, the CDM EB’s guidance on baseline establishment states “If a 
proposed CDM project activity seeks to retrofit or otherwise modify an exist-
ing facility, the baseline may refer to the characteristics (i.e. emissions) of the 
existing facility only to the extent that the project activity does not increase 
the output or lifetime of the existing facility. For any increase of output or 
lifetime of the facility which is due to the project activity, a different baseline 
shall apply” (UNFCCC 2003a, p. 2). Given the background of the intended pro-
duction increase, there might be some who will argue that approach 48a is not 
allowed for this case. Second, the project developer has to demonstrate, through 
the baseline methodology, “that a project activity is additional and therefore 
not the baseline scenario (UNFCCC, 2003a, p. 1)”. As had been shown in the 
paragraph on additionality, this will constitute a problem for the project activ-
ity. However, a baseline on the basis of approach 48c “most economically at-
tractive alternative” does not make sense either. In this case the baseline 
would be the project activity and no CERs would be generated. The final option 
48c “average emissions of similar projects” also causes problems: in the project 
idea note it was pointed out that the technology “is presently used in Argen-
tina and other Latin American countries, such as Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uru-
guay and Brazil, with very good results”. Hence, there is the danger that, once 
again, the baseline is close to the project emissions after project implementa-
tion. A detailed statistical analysis would be needed to quantify figures. In 
sum, the establishment of an acceptable baseline might cause some problems. 
External verification: will be conducted as part of the CDM cycle.
    Other positive or negative environmental impacts
    Emissions of other pollutants through the uncontrolled burning of saw 
dust in mills will be reduced.
    Contribution to sustainable development
    The proposed project does not involve technology transfer.
    Costs of compensation
    A CER price has not been indicated in the project idea note.
    Economic benefits for the compensating entity
    The project is characterised by a solid image and it is easy to understand/
communicate. 
    Situation in host country
    Argentina has ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2001 and has nom-
inated the Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development as the Na-56
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tional Designated Authority (UNFCCC 2005a). The Argentine Government is 
also establishing a national evaluation system for CDM project proposals. Na-
tional sustainability criteria have not yet been defined. 









Argentina 22.2 7 2.5 (rank 93)
* For comparison: Switzerland = 95.2, Germany = 92.4
** 1 = lowest risk category, 7 = highest risk category
*** Finland: rank 1 (Score 9.7), Germany: rank 16 (Score 7.7)
    Quantity of emission reductions generated 
    Without checking for leakage effects, an annual CO2 reduction of about 
12,000 tons can be expected (Calculation: 3,750 tons heavy oil * 41 GJ/t = 152.8 
TJ * 78 t CO2/TJ = 11,993 t CO2)
    Other project risks
    Unknown. 
    Data availability and quality
    Moderate-good for project activity and host country.
Country Risk Evaluation – Key Indicators57
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    Table 16 summarises the results of case study evaluations under the   
assumed value system of the GTZ. Case studies II and I (wind park in Algeria 
and small hydro power plant in India) are the top-performers and would thus 
be the first choices for the compensating entity. The wind park is characterised 
by  a  better  performance  with  regard  to  delivery  of  real  reductions  (here:   
additionality) and contribution to sustainable development (hydro power as 
standard technology in India). On the contrary, India performs better with 
regard to the host country situation, especially with a view to CDM infrastruc-
ture.
    Case study IV (biogas utilization Thailand) constitutes the medium-class. 
The major “deficiencies” of the Thai project are its unpopular image and the 
expected disqualification for Small Scale and Gold Standard Status. 
    Case studies III (landfill gas collection Tunisia) and V would not be short-
listed under the assumed preferences of the compensating entity. The Tuni-
sian project suffers from bad performance in terms of success probability un-
der the certification regimes (potential ODA involvement, public tender). Case 
Study V has the worst evaluation with regard to GHG mitigation, since the 
project can be considered as economically attractive. This criterion has a dis-
qualifying character under the assumed value system of the GTZ.
    It must be noted, however, that the evaluation has been conducted in a 
situation of incomplete information. Not all project proposals contained com-
prehensive data, especially with regard to finances. The (conservative) as-
sumptions that have been made by the author might be disproved by reality. 
It was not possible to consider one of the major economic parameters – cost of 
compensation – because the certificate price was only indicated for two out of 
five projects.
    After having conducted five case studies for the assumed value system 
of the GTZ, a sensitivity test for the weighting factors (preferences of a com-
pensating entity) is conducted in the following. 
    This is done by creating two fictitious compensating entities (FCE) with 
contrasting value systems. FCE 1 is supposed to focus on economic drivers, 
while FCE 2 focuses on environmental and social aspects. Therefore, the rele-
vance of the criteria “certification regime(s), project type, reduction of GHG 
emissions, other environmental benefits and contribution to sustainable de-
velopment” are scaled down/up (FCE 1: wn = 1; FCE 2: wn = 4/5), whereas the 
criteria “economic benefits, situation in host country, and other project risks” 
are scaled up/down (FCE 1: wn = 4; FCE 2: wn = 1). Table 17 and Table 18 summarise 
both applied values of weighting factors (wn) and the results of project ranking 
under the changed value systems. 
3.5  |  Résumé
3.5.1 |  Sensitivity of indicator scores Sn
3.5.2 |  Sensitivity of weighting factors wn60
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    In sum, the ranking order of projects indeed changes under different 
value systems. Consequently, the proposed methodology is sensitive towards 
applied weighting factors wn. One might argue that there is a moderate bias 
for “ecologically integer projects”, i.e. an emphasis of the criteria “delivery of 
real reductions” and “certificate regime”. However, given the initial assump-
tion that all compensating entities have an interest to engage in high-quality 
projects (see p. 20 et seqq.), this can be considered reasonable. 
    If this bias was to be eliminated, one would also need to allow weighting 
values wn = 0 and wn = 5 for Category-II Criteria. In this case, the economically 
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1.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.8
Total score 15.3 14.3 13.7 11.7 12.7
    The proposed methodology for selection of compensation projects proved 
to be suitable to consider both project characteristics and individual value sys-
tems of compensating entities in a standardised manner. 
    The proposed matrix should not be interpreted as unalterable. Instead, 
an adaptation to the individual task may be appropriate. As an example, the 
indicator “external verification” was not influential for the given case because 
all CDM projects have to undergo an external verification. For other cases, 
however, this indicator could be helpful. The experience from the case studies 
Table 19: Alternative weighting factors
3.5.3 |  Conclusions63
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also shows that: 
a)    expert judgement is necessary to comprehensively consider all project 
           characteristics and arrive at a quantitative evaluation; and that
b)    regardless of the predefined structures of the approach, a considerable 
           degree of freedom is given to the evaluating expert. 
    Consequently, it is recommended that a given set of project proposals be 
evaluated by one and the same person. This enhances the consistency of re-
sults. Furthermore, quantitative results should not be interpreted too strictly. 
The methodology allows a grouping of projects, but not a direct ranking based 
on the second decimal point. 
    A further calibration of the proposed methodology would be possible by 
adapting the weighting scores wn. 
    Finally, it must be noted that each evaluation can only be a snapshot of 
the current situation. Changes with regard to national circumstances, techni-
cal details/capacities of the proposed project etc. might quickly change the 
picture. Missing or insufficient data represents a problem as it might lead to 
wrong or at least incomplete assessments. Another issue is that the demands 
of a compensating entity might change over time. This can be due either to 
internal reasons, e.g. changed attitudes of the compensating entity, or due to 
the fact that the “perfect project” cannot be found. In the latter case, theoreti-
cal demands cannot be satisfied by practical supply. An adaptation of demands 
through the compensating entity might be the consequence. This aspect is an 
element of descriptive decision theory and is thus not considered further with-
in the scope of this paper.64
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4 | Voluntary compensation and international 
     climate policies
    In this section, the impact of voluntary compensation on other climate 
policy systems in the time period 2005-2012 is discussed. Central questions are:
–   Does  voluntary  compensation  enhance  the  ecological  effectiveness  of 
     (inter-)national climate policy regimes?
–   Does voluntary compensation influence prices on greenhouse gas markets?
    The first question in this regard is whether there are interactions be-
tween voluntary compensation and national or international climate policies 
at all. In the scope of this analysis, both the international climate policy sys-
tem under the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol and the EU Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trading Scheme  will be examined, since these currently are the most impor-
tant regimes with binding GHG emission targets. 
    As has been pointed out in chapter 2.2, different types of reduction cred-
its may be used for voluntary compensation. The underlying certification re-
gime for GHG reduction credits was identified as one major selection criterion. 
Interactions between voluntary compensation and (inter-)national climate 
policy systems depend on the underlying certificate regime and thus the selec-
tion through the compensating entity. In the following, it is differentiated 
between the Kyoto System and the EU ETS .
    Interactions between voluntary compensation and the Kyoto System ex-
ist, if the compensating entity chooses a Kyoto compatible certification re-
gime: Green Investment Schemes (project backed AAUs), Joint Implementa-
tion  (CERs),  or  Clean  Development  Mechanism  (CERs)  –  including  all  its 
sub-categories as Small Scale, Gold Standard, technical and sinks projects. If 
the compensating entity chooses Verified Emission Reduction Projects (VERs) 
there are no direct interactions. Although the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol commences only in 2008, there is a link with some compensa-
tion activities that are carried out today. Certified emission reductions from 
CDM projects, which are generated before 2008, can be “banked” into the first 
commitment period (Betz et al. 2001, p. 19). With regard to GIS schemes, options 
for AAUs can be issued for projects that are implemented today. Emission re-
duction units from JI projects can only be generated from 2008 onwards. 
    Before interactions with voluntary compensation are discussed, a short 
review of the EU ETS and its background is given. As a response to increasing 
CO2 emissions in Europe in the late 1990s (EEA, 2003), the European Commis-
sion published a Green Book on CO2 emissions trading in March 2000. The   
EU ETS was supposed as a national policy to support the EU’s compliance with 
4.1  |  Interactions with other climate policy systems
4.1.1 |  Interactions with the Kyoto System
4.1.2 |  Interactions with the EU ETS65
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its Kyoto target. After intense political negotiations, the emissions trading di-
rective was passed in July 2003. The trading scheme formally started opera-
tion on January 1st 2005. This equals an implementation period of less than five 
years.
    Major characteristics of the EU ETS are binding emissions targets for in-
stallations from energy intensive industries that exceed a certain capacity 
threshold, e.g. 20 MW thermal capacity for combustion installations. These 
installations need a general “permit” to emit greenhouse gases and obtain an 
allocation15 of “EU allowances” representing its absolute emissions budget for 
a year/compliance period. Operators have to monitor their emissions accord-
ing to the monitoring guidelines of the EU Commission (EU, 2004) and report 
them to their national authority until February 28th of the following year. 
Emissions have to be balanced by surrendering the responding amount of 
emission allowances. Allowances can be bought or sold on the market. They 
can also be banked into the next year – except from 2007 to 2008, since this 
represents the transition from the first to the second trading period of the EU 
ETS. If an operator fails to surrender a sufficient amount of allowances, penal-
ties are imposed. In the first period, 40 €/t CO2 have to be paid, in the second 
100 €/t CO2-eq. During the first period, the trading scheme is limited to carbon 
dioxide. Further Kyoto gases might be included in later stages (EU, 2003). 
    The so-called Linking Directive (“Amending directive of the EU-ETS in 
respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms”, EU 2004a) allows opera-
tors to use CERs from 2005 onwards and potentially credits from JI- and/or 
NCPs from 2008 onwards. The latter is subject to the review process of the EU-
ETS scheduled for 2006. With regard to the inclusion of CDM, there is an exclu-
sion of CERs from sinks, large hydro, and nuclear power projects. CERs from 
accepted projects will be transferred into allowances on a 1:1 ratio (EU 2004 a). 
    Further information on the background and design of the EU ETS is pro-
vided in AGE (2002, 2002a), Butzengeiger et al. (2004), (Zapfel 2001), Butzengei-
ger et al. (2003), Bode et al. (2003), or Christiansen et al. (2005).
    Interactions with voluntary compensation exist, if the compensating en-
tity chooses a compensation regime generating reduction certificates that are 
eligible under the EU ETS. Due to the limitations described above, these are 
currently only CERs stemming from technical projects (except nuclear power 
and large hydro power projects).
    Table 20 summarises the above-described interactions.








x x – x – –
Kyoto 
2008-12











* considered in review-process 2005; also nuclear and large hydro
x = interaction exists           –  = no interaction 
15   In 2005-2007, at least 95% of allowances are to 
be allocated free of charge, and at least 90% from 
2008 onwards.
Table 20: Interactions of voluntary compensation 
with selected climate policy systems in dependence 
on the chosen certificate regime66
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    For cases in which interactions between voluntary compensation and 
(inter-)national climate policy systems exist, the subsequent question is: what 
are the impacts on these systems? As a first step, effects are discussed quanti-
tatively, while chapter 4.2.2 estimates quantitative effects, based on recent 
and expected volumes. 
    Under the precondition that the compensating entity chooses a certifica-
tion regime, which generates credits eligible under the Kyoto System and/or 
the EU ETS, voluntary compensation constitutes an additional demand for cer-
tificates.
    With regard to market prices under these regimes, this generally leads to 
an increase in prices. Figure 9 illustrates this. The curves S and D represent the 
supply and demand in a market without additional demand through volun-
tary compensation. The market price for certificates is p0. The increased de-
mand as a result of voluntary compensation is presented through curve DVC. 
Given a constant supply S, the market price will increase to p1. Generally, the 
higher the additional demand through voluntary compensation, the higher 
market price.
    The impact of voluntary compensation on the ecological effectiveness of 
the climate policy regimes is similar. Under the assumption that only real 
emission reductions generate reduction units, voluntary compensation will 
increase the deficit of emission certificates. Consequently, targeted entities 
have to find alternatives for reaching their emission targets. This can either be 
done through reducing own emissions or buying emission rights/reduction 
certificates. The latter alternative leads to an emission reduction elsewhere. 
Thus, an additional reduction of GHG emissions results in both approaches.
4.2  |  Effects on market prices and ecological effectiveness
4.2.1 |  Qualitative evaluation
Figure 9: Qualitative effects of voluntary 
compensation on market prices under the 
Kyoto System/EU ETS
    This chapter attempts to evaluate the quantitative relevance of volun-
tary compensation in terms of ecological effectiveness and market prices of 
the climate policy regimes. This is done by comparing recent market develop-
ments and future estimates for voluntary compensation with those of the 
Kyoto System and the EU ETS. 
4.2.2 |  Quantitative evaluation
Price
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    Market developments: Kyoto System
    An indicator for the demand of eligible certificates is the “distance to 
target”, which is the difference between actual or forecasted GHG emissions 
and the defined emission targets.
    The analysis of GHG emission trends of Annex-B countries of the Kyoto 
Protocol reveals that in several countries, GHG emissions have been strongly 
increasing instead of decreasing. Examples hereof are Australia (+22.2% from 
1990 to 2002), Canada (+20.1%), Greece (+26.0%), Ireland (+28.9%), Japan (+12.1%), 
New Zealand (+21.6%), Portugal and Spain (+40.5% each), and the United States 
of America (+13.1%). However, these emission increases are offset by signifi-
cant decreases in other Annex-B countries – mostly economies in transition. 
Russia, the Ukraine, Poland and Romania are those countries with the largest 
volumes of surplus emission rights when considering 2002 data. Trends in   
aggregate GHG emissions in 1990 and 2002 as well as targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol and distances to target are depicted in Table 21.















Australia 430,513 526,042 22,2 8 464,954 61,088
Austria 77,746 84,621 8.8 -8 71,526 13,095
Belgium 146,067 150,311 2.9 -8 134,382 15,929
Bulgariaa 141,821 62,429 -56.0 -8 130,475 -68,046
Canada 608,704 731,209 20.1 -6 572,182 159,027
Croatia 31,609 27,962 -11.5 -5 30,029 -2,067
Czech Republic 192,019 144,217 -24.9 -8 176,657 -32,440
Denmark 68,750 68,491 -0.4 -8 63,250 5,241
Estonia 43,494 19,502 -55.2 -8 40,014 -20,512
Finland 76,770 81,963 6.8 -8 70,628 11,335
France 564,233 553,410 -1.9 -8 519,094 34,316
Germany 1,246,816 1,014,627 -18.6 -8 1,147,071 -132,444
Greece 107,149 134,992 26.0 -8 98,577 36,415
Hungarya 113,074 78,002 -31.0 -6 106,290 -28,288
Iceland 3,322 3,181 -4.2 10 3,654 -473
Ireland 53,418 68,875 28.9 -8 49,145 19,730
Italy 509,078 553,781 8.8 -8 468,352 85,429
Japan 1,187,269 1,330,793 12.1 -6 1,116,033 214,760
Latvia 28,921 10,756 -62.8 -8 26,607 -15,851
Liechtenstein 218 218 0.0 -8 201 17
Lithuania 50,134 17,215 -65.7 -8 46,123 -28,908
Luxembourg 13,448 10,833 -19.4 -8 12,372 -1,539
Monaco 73 96 31.5 -8 67 29
Netherlands 211,384 213,765 1.1 -8 194,473 19,292
New Zealand 61,640 74,976 21.6 0 61,640 13,336
Norway 52,136 55,343 6.2 1 52,657 2,686
Polanda 564,419 382,791 -32.2 -6 530,554 -147,763
Portugal 58,362 81,982 40.5 -8 53,693 28,289
Romaniaa 262,833 136,559 -48.0 -8 241,806 -105,247
Russian Federation 3,050,000 1,876,000 -38.5 0 3,050,000 -1,174,000
Slovakia 72,436 51,896 -28.4 -8 66,641 -14,745
Sloveniaa 20,601 20,383 -1.1 -8 18,953 1,430
Spain 284,556 399,732 40.5 -8 261,792 137,940
Sweden 72,140 69,601 -3.5 -8 66,369 3,232
Switzerland 53,137 52,254 -1.7 -8 48,886 3,368
Ukraine 919,189 483,525 -47.4 0 919,189 -435,664
United Kingdom 742,639 634,858 -14.5 -8 683,228 -48,37068
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16  Annex-I-Parties of the UNFCCC do have the obli-
gation to submit national communications, which in 
future will also have to contain projections of emis-
sions estimates up to 2020 for all sectors (IISD, 2004). 
However, the fourth national communications are due 
for submission only by January 1st 2006. IEA (2000, 
2002) contain projections of CO2 emissions for 2010 
and 2020, but only by region and sector, not by country.
Box 2: Overview of estimates on reduction 
requirements and CDM/JI market size
    As a first evaluation, one might conclude that the demand for further 
emission reductions (both in Annex-B countries and via CDM/JI) is zero. A sim-
ple transfer of Assigned Amount Units between Annex-B countries seems suf-
ficient to make all Parties comply with their Kyoto targets. However, at least 
two further aspects need to be recognised. 
    First, the above data presents actual emissions, not those of the compli-
ance period under the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, effective demand/surplus is sub-
ject to change16. Several model estimates on the volume of required emission 
reductions and/or the market size for CDM (and JI) projects have been pub-
lished since the late 1990s. However, if one compares the results of these esti-
mates, a remarkable variability of results can be realised, also see Box 2. This 
is primarily due to the incorporation of recent economic and political trends 
into younger estimates. An example of the latter is the official withdrawal of 
the US from the Kyoto System in early 2001.
    Second, political strategies play an important role. These include e.g.: 
–  “buyer countries” wish for autonomy (no dependence on seller countries 
  and their price policies), 
–   the option for “seller countries” to bank surplus AAUs into a potential next 
  Kyoto  period  (more  flexibility  for  upcoming  target  negotiations  for  the     
  post 2012-period), 
–  other strategic behaviour by seller countries (willingness to sell), and
–   international image (key word “indulgence trading”). 
    Strategies of this kind explain why there is actually a considerable de-
mand for CERs and ERUs by Annex-B countries. Several buy-up programmes 
for reduction certificates from JI and CDM projects have been established in 
recent years both by Annex-B countries and international organisations/fi-
Estimates of the CDM market size (overview)
A survey of the Inter-American Development Bank states the range of estimates 
on the CDM market size as 528 to 2,651 Mt CO2-eq in the Kyoto commitment 
period (IADB, 2002). One must note, however, that these estimates did not in-
corporate the withdrawal of the USA yet. Dhakal (2001) provides an overview 
of different forecasts for GHG emissions of Annex-B countries in the period 
2008-12. The range is from +2.0% to +30% compared to 1990 (Dhakal, 2001, p. 3).
Jotzo et al. (2001) estimated the total demand for emission reductions in the 
first commitment period as 927 Mt CO2 per year, of which 32% were expected 
to be generated by the CDM (297 Mt CO2-eq annually) and 8% by JI (78 Mt CO2-eq 
annually). This equals a total of 1,875 Mt CO2-eq in the 5-year Kyoto period. In a 
revised version of the model, the annual demand is estimated as 1.1 billion t 
CO2-eq, to which the CDM would contribute 33% and JI 5% (Michaelowa and 
Jotzo, 2003). 
United States 6,129,118 6,934,562 13.1 -7 5,700,080 1,234,482
European 
Communityb 4,231,442 4,123,618 -2.5 -8 3,892,927 230,691
Total without USA 12,120,118 10,207,191 -1,390,374
Total with USA 18,249,236 17,141,753 -155,891
a) In accordance with decision 9/CP.2, some Parties with economies in transition use base years other than 1990: 
Bulgaria (1988), Hungary (1985-87), Poland (1988), Romania (1989), Slovenia (1986).
b) Emission estimates of the European Community are reported separately from those of its Member States. 
Source:  UNFCCC (2004a), own calculations
Table 21: Trends in GHG-emissions 
of Annex-B-Parties, 1990/200269
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nancial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) or the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). In 2004, a total of 21 buy-up programmes had been implemented. 
This is a strong increase compared to 2002 and 2003, when 7 and 12 such pro-
grammes existed (De Dominicis, 2005). While these programmes differ with 
regard to investors (governmental programmes or private investors) and time 
horizon, all of them aim to generate CERs and/or ERUs through the investment 
in GHG reduction projects. The total financial volume of these programmes 
amounted to 1.547 billion Euro at the end of 2004. Under the assumption that 
90% of these funds are used to buy reduction credits, and with average market 
prices of 4.0-7.0 € per CER/ERU (see Table 2), the total demand from the cur-
rently initiated programmes is in the range of 200 and 350 million CERs/ERUs 
until 2012. More detailed information on the structure and major characteris-
tics of these programmes can be found in de Dominicis (2005).
    Market developments: EU ETS
    Demand for emission reduction certificates also comes from operators of 
installations that are targeted under the EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading 
Scheme, also see chapter 4.1.2. However, there currently are no publicly avail-
able estimates on this demand. This is due to the fact that the approval process 
of national allocation plans (NAPs) by the EU Commission was not finalised at 
the time of writing this paper. In March 2005, the EU Commission requested 
Poland to reduce its NAP by 140 million tons over the 2005 to 2007 period, 
which equals a reduction of about 16%. NAPs of other Member States, e.g. the 
United Kingdom, Italy or Greece, were not granted the final approval yet. Fur-
thermore, allocation methods differed significantly in Member States, so that 
a common basis for comparison is difficult to establish. Some Member States 
like Germany allocated allowances on the basis of historical emissions, while 
others allocated on the basis of business-as-usual emission scenarios with 
varying  assumptions.  Further  information  on  allocation  processes  can  be 
found in Grubb et al. (2005), Betz et al. (2004) and Gilbert et al. (2004). 
    Market developments: JI and CDM markets
    Data availability is better for the supply side. According to Point Carbon, 
contracted CDM and JI projects numbered about 38 and amounted close to 9 
million tons CO2-eq in 2004. Trends since 2001 are depicted in Figure 10 (Point 
Carbon 2005; Tangen 2005). A strong increase in the CDM market size is ex-
pected: about 250 million CERs per annum by 2012 (Buen, 2005).












Mt Co2-e Recent project volumes of JI/CDM projects
Figure 10: Recent trends of contracted 
project volumes of CDM/JI projects 70
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Figure 11: Voluntary compensation – 
volumes since 2001 and shares of 
certificate types
    The interpretation of future expectations on VC volumes is not trivial due 
to two aspects. First, several service providers found it difficult to give such 
forecasts, and thus a few refrained from providing figures. This reduces the 
number of utilizable answers. Second, expectations on the future VC-market 
vary largely. As an example, projections for the annual demand in the period 
2008-12 range from 50,000 to 50 million tons, also see Annex III.
    Consequently, a strict arithmetic interpretation of the answers does not 
seem appropriate. Instead, rough estimates on expectable maximum CER and 
ERU volumes are derived as follows:
17  It might also be interesting to note that about 3.5% 
of certificates stem from renewable energy projects, 
68% from supply side projects, close to 13% from   
demand side projects, and close to 16% from sinks 
pro-jects (average of 2002-2004).
2004
10
















Share of certificate types used for voluntary
compensation in 2002-04
CERs ERUs VERs
    Market developments: Voluntary Compensation
    Studies on recent and/or expected volumes of voluntary compensation 
do not yet publicly exist. In order to estimate the market size of voluntary 
compensation, a survey among service providers has been conducted for the 
analysis. The underlying thought is that service providers themselves can be 
assumed to have deepest possible market insights and can thus provide a sol-
id expert opinion. The overview of relevant service providers as given by Braun 
and Stute (2004, pp. 36-37) has been updated and was taken as the basis for the 
survey. In total, questionnaires were sent to 31 service providers. They can be 
assumed to represent the overwhelming share of the VC market. 18 of the in-
terviewees  responded.  As  two  of  them  discontinued  their  services  in  the 
meantime, 16 answers remained for evaluation. It must be noted that not all 
interviewees answered all questions comprehensively, such that the effective 
number of answers available in some cases is lower.
    Questions of the survey as well as responses are shown in Annex III; re-
sults are summarised in the following. A general observation is that until 
2001, the VC market was clearly dominated by compensation by means of 
verified reduction projects. Five out of six service providers purely used VERs 
for compensation at that time. Since then, the amount of (new) service provid-
ers on the market, which use options of CERs/ERUs, increased. In 2004, only six 
out of the 16 were using 100% VERs for compensation. VERs clearly continue to 
dominate the market in absolute terms.
    As can be seen from Figure 11, the overall volume of voluntary compensa-
tion increased steadily since 2001. Weighting service providers’ declarations 
on typical shares of used certificate types with the underlying compensation 
volumes; it turns out that closely 95% of emission are compensated by means 
of VERs. CERs account for only 3.5%, ERUs to less than 2%17. When looking at the 
absolute volumes of VC as indicated in Figure 11, one should be reminded that 
only about 50% of the internationally known service providers participated in 
the survey.71
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Table 22: Estimates of market size for VC in 
2005-07 and 2008-12
    a) Consideration of the whole VC market
    If estimates for the VC market as a whole are taken as the basis, the aver-
age expectation is roughly 1,360,000 t CO2-eq per annum for the period 2005-07, 
and 6,320,000 t CO2-eq per annum for the period 2008-2012. The most optimistic 
projection is 6 million and 50 million t CO2-eq per annum in the respective pe-












   
    However, this is the total amount for reduction certificates from the 
CDM, JI and from Verified Reduction Projects. As the survey revealed, the cur-
rent share within VC is 94.6% VERs, 3.7% CERs and 1.8% ERUs. If one assumes 
this share to remain constant in upcoming years, for the best-case-scenario an 
annual amount of 5.64 million VERs, 0.24 million CERs, and 0.12 million ERUs 
can  be  expected  for  the  period  2005-07.  For  the  period  2008-12,  annually   
47 million VERs, 2 million CERs, and 1 million ERUs can be estimated.
    b) Consideration of the VC market share relevant for interactions with the 
                Kyoto System and/or EU ETS
    An alternative approach is to exclude all those service providers’ estima-
tions from the analysis that are characterised by 100%-VER-share. This exclu-
sion can be justified since their activities do not interact with the Kyoto System 
or the EU ETS. 
    Following this approach, new estimates for the period 2005-07 result: 
annually  about  1  million  tons  as  the  average  and  4.5  million  tons  as  the   
maximum value (see Table 23). It must be noted that no adequate figure can be 
given for the period 2008-12 since several interviewees refrained from pro- 
viding  such  long-term  estimates.  Thus,  data  for  long-term  estimates  is   
insufficient.
Expected annual demand










* some interviewees refrained from providing long-term estimates
** no average has been calculated due to insufficient data
    In  addition,  different  shares  of  underlying  certificate  types  emerge   
under this approach, see Figure 12. Taking these certificate shares and the 
maximum expectation for VC volumes as the basis, 1.85 million VERs, 1.8 mil-
lion CERs, and 0.86 million ERUs per annum can be named as the estimate for 
2005-07.
Table 23: Estimates of market size 
for VC in 2005-07 and 2008-12 
(excluding 100%-VER-compensation)72
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    To sum it up, a statistical interpretation of the responses to the survey is 
not possible due to insufficient data. As a rough estimate, expected certificate 
volumes used for voluntary compensation range from 0.25 to 2 million CERs 
and 0.1 to 0.9 million ERUs annually in the period 2005-07. One might want to 
add a safety margin of 100-200% to account for uncertainties or eventually 
increasing shares of CERs/VERs used for voluntary compensation.
    Synthesis
    If one compares expected volumes of the general CDM and JI markets 
with the estimates for CER/ERU volumes used for voluntary compensation in 
the period 2005-07, it becomes obvious that the order of magnitude differs 
significantly. This is portrayed in Figure 13. The share of VC in the interna-
tional JI and CDM market is comparably low as the global share of renewable 
electricity in the overall electricity market.
    Even under the most optimistic estimates for VC volumes as indicated in 
the survey (6 million tons CO2-eq per annum for the period 2005-07) and the 
assumption that only CERs and ERUs are used for compensation, the quantita-
tive influence is low. 
    A similar conclusion has to be drawn, if estimates for CER/ERU volumes 
used for voluntary compensation are compared with the demand generated 
by the above mentioned buy-up programmes. The calculated demand of 200-
350 billion CERs/ERUs until 2012 does not yet reflect the additional demand on 
company level that will be created by the EU ETS.
Figure 12: Shares of certificate types used for VC 
since 2001 (excluding 100%-VER-compensation)
Figure 13: Recent and forecasted contract 
volumes for GHG reduction projects 
41% 40%
19%
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    To answer the introductory questions of this chapter: “Does voluntary 
compensation enhance the ecological effectiveness of (inter-)national climate 
policy regimes? Does it influence prices on greenhouse gas markets?” – Theo-
retically yes, practically rather not, at least not for the time being. If this were 
to be achieved, awareness-raising programmes would have to be conducted. 
It would also be important to establish the public image that voluntary com-
pensation can be an ecologically integer way of reducing one’s own impact on 
the global climate system, if appropriate selection criteria are chosen.
    What might act as a strong driver for voluntary compensation is the as-
pect of corporate liability with regard to climate change. Recently, Swiss Re – 
one of the globally leading reinsurance companies and the world’s largest life 
and health reinsurer – announced plans to neutralise its CO2 emissions. The 
underlying argument is that “corporate […] liability on climate change is evolv-
ing perhaps more quickly than we’d like” (Swiss Re, 2003; Kecht, 2004). In Feb-
ruary 2005, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC) 
also announced plans to become “carbon neutral” as a consequence of the un-
derstanding that climate change represents “the largest single environmental 
challenge this century” (Dickinson, 2005).74
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5 | Annexes
    The applied method to quantify the qualitative indicator “risk profile of 
the host country” is a benchmark-approach that is only suitable for relative 
comparison of countries within a given group. It does not evaluate a country’s 
absolute performance. Since the objective is to select a project out of a pre- 
defined group, it is sufficient to evaluate the relative performance of projects 
within that group. 
    The worst possible score is -0.4, the best possible score is 0.4 with a sliding 
scale. Three independent country ratings are considered: the Country Credit 
Ranking (regularly provided by Institutional Investor18), a Country Corruption 
Index, and the Country Risk Classification as provided by the OECD. The Coun-
try Credit Ranking value is transformed into an Index (CCR-Index) through 
diversion by 10 – i.e. the Indian Country Credit Ranking of 50 equals a CCR-In-
dex-Value of 5.0. For each country, the total (column D) is calculated as:
Di = Ai + Bi - Ci  
The maximum total that has been reached by one of the countries under con-
sideration sets the benchmark. Here, Tunisia performs best and sets the bench-
mark at 7.4 points. These 7.4 points constitute 100% of the scores possible (with-
in the group of countries considered) and earn an indicator score Srisk_HC = 
0.4 (column E).



















Country A B C D E
India 5.3 2.8 4 4.1 0.22
Algeria 4.02 2.6 4 2.6 0.14
Tunisia 5.51 4.9 3 7.4 0.40
Thailand 5.95 3.3 3 6.3 0.34
Argentina 2.22 2.5 7 -2.3 -0.12
maximum score 7.4
18  Latest survey in September 2004;   
data taken from Sweeney et al. (2004)
Annex I  |  Methodology for evaluation of host countries’ risk profiles75
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    As stated in chapter 3.4.2, the analysis of financial data indicated a pay-
back period of 4.5 to 9 years depending on the effective wind yield. Details are 
provided in the three scenarios given below. Scenario I reflects the expected 
average wind yield of 22,000 MWh/year. Scenarios II and III state financial 
consequences of a respective 20% increase and decrease of the average wind 
yield.
Annex II  |  Additionality Assessment Case Study II
Scenario I – Expected average wind yield (22,000 MWh/y)
Case Study II – Algeria
Provided information / assumptions
Investment costs 8,000,000 US $
Annual maintenance* 75,000 US $
Repair years 1-10* 100,000 US $
Repair years 11-20 175,000 US $
Insurance fees* 50,000 US $
Discount rate 0.10
Electricity generation 22,000 MWh/Year
Electricity price (income) 90.0 US $/MWh
[US $] Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Annual revenues 1,980,000 1,782,000 1,603,800 1,443,420 1,299,078 1,169,170 1,052,253
Total revenues since operation start 1,980,000 3,762,000 5,365,800 6,809,220 8,108,298 9,277,468 10,329,721
Management/administration costs 79,200 71,280 64,152 57,737 51,963 46,767 42,090
*Other expenses 225,000 202,500 182,250 164,025 147,623 132,860 119,574
Total operation costs 304,200 273,780 246,402 221,762 199,586 179,627 161,664
Profit in year n 1,675,800 1,508,220 1,357,398 1,221,658 1,099,492 989,543 890,589
Total profit since 
operation start 1,675,800 3,184,020 4,541,418 5,763,076 6,862,569 7,852,112 8,742,701
The payback period under this scenario is about 6.2 years.
Scenario II – +20% average wind yield (26,400 MWh/y)
Case Study II – Algeria
Provided information / assumptions
Investment costs 8,000,000 US $
Annual maintenance* 75,000 US $
Repair years 1-10* 100,000 US $
Repair years 11-20 175,000 US $
Insurance fees* 50,000 US $
Discount rate 0.10
Electricity generation 26,400 MWh/Year
Electricity price (income) 90.0 US $/MWh
[US $] Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Annual revenues 2,376,000 2,138,400 1,924,560 1,732,104 1,558,894 1,403,004 1,262,704
Total revenues since operation start 2,376,000 4,514,400 6,438,960 8,171,064 9,729,958 11,132,962 12,395,666
Management/administration costs 95,040 85,536 76,982 69,284 62,356 56,120 50,508
*Other expenses 225,000 202,500 182,250 164,025 147,623 132,860 119,574
Total operation costs 320,040 288,036 259,232 233,309 209,978 188,980 170,082
Profit in year n 2,055,960 1,850,364 1,665,328 1,498,795 1,348,915 1,214,024 1,092,621
Total profit since 
operation start 2,055,960 3,906,324 5,571,652 7,070,446 8,419,362 9,633,386 10,726,007
The payback period under scenario II is about 4.6 years.76
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III-I  Survey questions
1.  Since when do you offer GHG compensation services (year/month)?
2.  How many CO2-eq did you compensate in the years since operation started?
  1999:  ________ t CO2-eq      2000:   ________ t CO2-eq
  2001:  ________ t CO2-eq         2002:  ________ t CO2-eq
  2003:  ________ t CO2-eq         2004:  ________ t CO2-eq
3.  What are your expectations on the overall future annual demand for  
      voluntary compensation?
  Period 2005-2007:  ________ t CO2-eq per year
  Period 2008-2012: ________ t CO2-eq per year
  Beyond 2012:  ________ t CO2-eq per year
4.  Project portfolio of your product(s): What kinds of projects are used for  
  compensation?
 
  Types of reduction credits:
  CDM projects (CERs):__ _%     JI projects (ERUs):__ _%     Other (VERs):__ _% 
Project type:
  ___ %  Renewable energy projects 
  ___ %  Supply side energy related reductions (e.g. fuel switch or energy 
       efﬁciency improvement)
  ___ %  Demand side energy related reductions (e.g. efﬁciency improvement)
  ___ %  Sinks/LULUCF projects
 
Project size:
  ___ %  Small scale (according to CDM rules)
  ___ %  “Regular” scale
  ___ %  Large scale (more than 200,000 t CO2/year)
Scenario III – -20% average wind yield (17,600 MWh/y)
Case Study II – Algeria
Provided information / assumptions
Investment costs 8,000,000 US $
Annual maintenance* 75,000 US $
Repair years 1-10* 100,000 US $
Repair years 11-20 175,000 US $
Insurance fees* 50,000 US $
Discount rate 0.10
Electricity generation 17,600 MWh/Year
Electricity price (income) 90.0 US $/MWh
[US $] Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Annual revenues 1,584,000 1,425,600 1,283,040 1,154,736 1,039,262 935,336 841,803 757,622 681,860 613,674
Total revenues since 
operation start
1,584,000 3,009,600 4,292,640 5,447,376 6,486,638 7,421,975 8,263,777 9,021,399 9,703,259 10,316,934
Management/
administration costs
63,360 57,024 51,322 46,189 41,570 37,413 33,672 30,305 27,274 24,547
*Other expenses 225,000 202,500 182,250 164,025 147,623 132,860 119,574 107,617 96,855 87,170
Total operation 
costs
288,360 259,524 233,572 210,214 189,193 170,274 153,246 137,922 124,130 111,717
Profit in year n 1,295,640 1,166,076 1,049,468 944,522 850,069 765,062 688,556 619,701 557,731 501,957
Total profit since 
operation start
1,295,640 2,461,716 3,511,184 4,455,706 5,305,775 6,070,838 6,759,394 7,379,095 7,936,825 8,438,783
The payback period under scenario III is about 9.2 years.
Annex III  | Survey on volumes and project types of voluntary compensation77
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Question 2 Question 
3
[MM/YY] 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005-2007 2008-2012 after 2012
I 2002 407 914 5,160 200,000* 250,000, 300,000
II 2002 325 2,000 15,000 100,000 500,000
III 1991 11,853 22,354 19,979 22,424 27,047 28,206
IV 2003 400 5,000 500,000 2,500,000 5,000,000
V 2004 3,000 20,000 50,000 500,000
VI 2002 14,000 50,000 170,000 175,000 200,000
VII 1999 125,000 0 250,000 0 500,000 100,000
VIII 2002 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,500,000
IX 1997 quantification “not possible” 2,500,000
X 2003 4,000,000 4,000,000 “increasing”
XI 1999 117,000 185,000 273,000 334,000 378,000 416,000 100,000 200,000
XII 1997 70,000 70,000 70,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 6,000,000 50,000,000 500,000,000
XIII 1998
XIV 1997 850,000 1,700,000 0 500,000 2,000,000 3,000,000
XV 1999 6,000 300,000** 1,000,000
XVI 2001 300 5,100 65,000 86,300 100,000 200,000 200,000
* Switzerland only     ** Europe only
Response
Question 4a Question 4b – Project type Question 4c – Project size














I 0 0 100 85 15 0 0 100 0 0
II 50 0 50 50 25 25 0 75 25 0
III 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 100 0 0
IV 35 15 50 60 20 20 0 50 40 10
V 100 0 0 50 0 50 0 100 0 0
VI 60 30 10 20 60 20 0 30 50 20
VII 0 0 100 33 0 33 33 100 0 0
VIII highly variable 50 25 25 0 60 20 20
IX 60 20 20 25 25 25 25 20 50 30
X 0 0 100 0 95 2 3 0 100 0
XI 40 20 40 0 0 0 100 0 100 0
XII 0 0 100 0 0 50 50 100 0 0
XIII 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
XIV 0 0 100 10 0 60 30 0 0 0
XV 80 0 20 100 0 0 0 100 0 0
XVI 4 1 95 23 0 75 2 5 20 7578
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